Specialized Courts of Appeals' Review of Bureaucratic Actions and the Politics of Protectionism

Abstract

Specialized courts are historically thought to serve only policy-neutral objectives. In the research presented here, I reexamine this widespread belief. The article analyzes the interaction between the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, a specialized circuit court, and bureaucratic agen cies to attempt to determine the Court's impact on U.S. trade policy out comes. Using dumping and foreign government subsidization cases brought to court in the 1980s, I develop and test an attribute model of judicial protectionism, encapsulating economic, political, and contextual legal circumstances surrounding international trade cases. The most no table findings are that the Federal Circuit shows a significant proclivity toward protecting U.S. industries against unfair trade practices of foreign competitors, suggesting that, contrary to previous thinking, specialized courts have far more than policy-neutral effects. Also, the International Trade Commission performs remarkably better in court than does the Department of Commerce due to the Commission's courtlike decisional strategy and independent political status. Finally, my model offers strong support for both political and case-related explanations of regulatory ac tivity, showing, e.g., that industry political power and organizational ability condition trade judges' decisions to dispense regulatory protection.