Abstract
In a democratic political system responsive to citizen demands govern ments must often balance conflicting interests. The rise of armed right- wing paramilitary groups, and especially the recent growth of citizen militias, have created such a situation in the American states. In particu lar, governments must respond to the threat of armed anti-government groups, while simultaneously attempting to address the "mainstream" con servative issues these groups often raise. This study examines how gov ernments balance these demands by developing a general theory of policy formation and adoption. We expect that adoption of anti-paramilitary laws is more likely when paramilitary groups pose a greater potential threat to the state and when elected Republicans are less conservative. Our model also controls for the activities of interest groups and the pos sibility that policy change is incremental. Using a data set of the fifty American states, we find that governments do balance opposing inter ests. While anti-paramilitary laws arise out of a perception of the threat posed by armed far-right groups, conservative Republicans, faced with a constituency that supports some issues raised by paramilitary groups, appear to try to limit the scope of anti-paramilitary laws.
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