Civil Rights Roll-Call Voting in the House of Representatives,1957-1991: A Systematic Analysis

Abstract

The record of civil rights roll-call votes in the House of Representatives has yet to be systematically explained or predicted. In particular, it is not clear why House members sometimes appear to have a great deal of inde pendence from constituency, but at other times are limited by negative public assessments. I contend that the key is the variation in content of different types of civil rights bills, and construct a categorical scale which rates bills voted on in the House from 1957-1991 according to potential costs (whether actual or perceived) to white Americans. The expectation that an increase in category will result in decreased likelihood of passage, and significantly smaller supporting coalitions, is supported. While par tisanship also emerges as a significant determinant of roll calls, a more complete explanation is arrived at when it is considered in conjunction with the legislative classification variable.