Loss Aversion and the Domestic Context of Military Intervention

Abstract

This article examines the impact of loss-aversion, as defined by prospect theory, upon the responses of the American public and Congress to U.S. military intervention abroad. In particular, it asks whether the manner in which the rationale for the intervention is framed (whether as intended to avert a loss or secure a gain) will influence the amount of support mus tered for the intervention. Justifications offered for the active use of U.S. force abroad are content-analyzed to determine whether the main justifica tion stresses avoiding a loss to an acquired geopolitical position (a "protec tive" intervention) or securing a net foreign policy gain (a "promotive" intervention). The extent of shifts in presidential popularity occasioned by the intervention are compared, controlling for the rationale offered and the effort made by the president (in the form of relevant speech-making) to justify the intervention. Regression analysis indicates that, with these con trolling influences, a protective intervention is expected to elicit a six per centage point approval differential over a promotive intervention. The article also examines the difference that the two sorts of justification make with regard to the likelihood that Congress would pass a resolution supporting the intervention. Although the evidence is more ambiguous here, it indi cates that a protectively framed intervention comes to being a necessary condition for a supportive resolution, though it is not a sufficient condition.