Abstract
Preferential trading arrangements, in the form of regional blocs, have emerged as a popular policy tool for the United States. Blocs are viewed by some policymakers and scholars as an effective defensive measure for shor ing up declining U.S. economic power. Others view blocs as a more prac tical first step toward multilateral liberalization. Critics of blocs view them as a suboptimal solution to economic problems which at best diverts time and resources better spent working toward multilateralism and at worst encourages protectionism, distrust, and confusion among states. This study seeks to examine the consequences of such policies for U.S. trading behav ior. More specifically, U.S. trading patterns are examined, within the con text of the global trading order, to determine the extent to which the U.S. is a regional or a global actor. Covering the period from 1950 to 1990, this study employs asymmetric multidimensional scaling to spatially place U.S. trading patterns in the world trading order. Results indicate that U.S. trad ing patterns are "global" with respect to developed states.
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