Abstract
In this study we examine how party controlled redistricting in 1991-92 affected the fortunes of U.S. House incumbents in the 1992 election. We explore the strategic differences between the partisan redistricting plans implemented unilaterally by one party, and the bipartisan plans im plemented as the result of party compromise, arguing that effective analysis of incumbency advantage requires distinction between these two types of plans as well as distinction between the plans of states that gain seats, states that lose seats, and states that remain unchanged in reapportion ment. We then assess incumbency advantage under the partisan and bipartisan plans by comparing incumbent displacement rates under these plans with the displacement rates under politically neutral nonpartisan dis tricting plans. Our findings indicate that incumbents do indeed benefit from party controlled redistricting and more so under bipartisan than un der partisan redistricting. They also indicate that the gain or loss of seats from reapportionment influences substantially the consequences of redis tricting for incumbents.
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