This research examines the impact of changes in the presidential appoint ment process on case processing in the regional offices of regulatory boards using the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) as a case in point. While controlling for regionally determined factors, this study investigates whether changes in the presidential appointment process influence clien tele strategies and the decision-making routines of regional offices. The results show that changes in the presidential appointment process, group strength, and unemployment differentially influence case-filtering and clientele filing behavior in NLRB regional offices generally, and particularly in those offices where clientele are weak or caseloads are low. Only changes in the presidential appointment process had a significant influ ence on both staff and clientele behavior
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