Rational Choice and Political Participation — Evaluating the Debate

Abstract

This paper evaluates rational choice models of political participation both at the theoretical and empirical levels. The theoretical discussion is con cerned with evaluating attempts which have been made to circumvent the paradox of participation-the proposition introduced by Mancur Olson that rational actors will not get involved in collective action in order to achieve common goals. The analysis suggests that the paradox is more of an intrac table problem for rational choice theory than is commonly recognized. The empirical section of the paper uses data from the first national survey of Conservative party members in Britain to model the determinants of political activism. It tests rational actor models against an alternative "general incen tives" theory of participation which includes variables that are not consis tent with rational choice theory. The conclusion is that while a rational choice model gives great insights into political participation, it provides an in complete account of participation, and by implication this may be true of such models in other areas of political science.