In this article we conduct an examination of voter sensitivity to levels of state taxation by developing and testing models that emphasize the infor mation costs associated with taxation issues. We are able to demonstrate, in some contrast to previous studies, that mass opinion about taxation has systematic and predictable components. Hostility to state taxes is found to vary systematically with actual tax levels. We also demonstrate that voters are able to link opinions on taxes to opinions of government performance.
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