Although social choice theorists have long recognized the theoretical possibility of cyclical majorities in democratic settings, it has been difficult to find a clear example of cyclical voting in a real-world setting. This is at least partly due to the fact that legislative rules suppress their appearance. This paper identifies and examines a definitive and significant example of cyclical voting. The cycle occurred in a series of votes in the U.S. Senate during one week in January 1925 on the issue of what the federal government should do with the Muscle Shoals works, initiated during World War I and still a significant political issue in the 1920s.
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