Abstract
The bulk of the literature rejects the argument that Democratic failure in presidential elections between 1968 and 1988 had an ideological basis. Analysis of the interplay of respondents' own issue positions with their perceptions of the parties/candidates suggests a different and rather complex picture. Between 1968 and 1980, the partisan/ideological cores of the two parties-liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans- behave quite differently: only moderately different defection rates between the most liberal Democrats and most conservative Republicans increase considerably as one moves from the relevant ideological extreme to the center. Placement of parties/candidates in issue space explains this asymmetry during this initial period of Democratic decline: the Democratic party/candidate is perceived as far to the left, with Demo cratic identifiers positioned midway between the electoral alternatives; Republicans identifiers, in contrast, are to the right of both parties/candid ates, but very close to their own. Beginning in 1980, the Reagan candidacy/administration push popular images of the Republicans to the right, eliminating their ideological advantage and forcing us to look elsewhere for the basis of continued Democratic losses.
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