This research examines what factors are likely to cause the Congress to attempt to reverse Supreme Court decisions that hold federal laws unconstitutional during the Warren, Burger, and early years of the Rehnquist courts. First, we outline a general theory of congressional motivation to reverse Supreme Court decisions that looks to both electoral considerations and the need to safeguard congressional power as the primary motivating factors. Using a data set consisting of 65 Court decisions that reversed all or part of some federal statute(s), we test our hypotheses using a probit model to predict when the Congress will take counteraction. We find that the electoral considerations of public opinion and interest group pressure are likely to lead to a congressional response, while the institutional considerations of court unanimity and the age of the legislation struck down are also important. The congress, however, is most likely not to take any decision reversal action.
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