Equality and Responsive Institutions: Elements of a General Model

Abstract

In the study of American Government, there have been few ideas more persistent or provocative than the notion that the Constitution was designed to restrict governmental responsiveness. At least since Beard, critics of the American system have argued that widely supported progressive policies are thwarted by the institutional features of Madisonian democracy. Since progressive policies include efforts to make income distribution more equal, advocates of "participative" or "expansive" democracy naturally hypothesize that greater institutional responsiveness will lead to greater social and economic equality. It is argued here that this empirical question cannot be constructively addressed within the conceptual frameworks of either the progressive adherents of such reforms or of most established rational choice perspectives. I construct a model to indicate how the effect of institutional responsiveness on equality depends on the distribution across classes of political participation, the differences between positive and defensive political action, and the costs of lobbying movements.