Complicated Loyalties: Latino Attitudes About Immigration in an Era of Changing Identities and Demographics

Abstract

As evidenced by its prominence in the 2024 presidential election, and subsequent Trump administration policies, immigration remains a polarizing and controversial topic in U.S. politics. While Latinos have historically been perceived as largely supportive of liberal immigration policy, recent events and the shifting identities and demographics of the Latino population call this perception into question. Given changes among the Latino electorate, we investigate immigration attitudes within this increasingly diverse community. Using the largest public opinion dataset in the United States, we analyze attitudes toward restrictive immigration policy of over 30,000 Latinos. We evaluate the effects of identity through predictors such as nativity, immigration status, group perceptions, partisanship, and ideology to understand the correlates of Latino public opinion toward immigration. Our findings highlight the role of conservative ideology, which is increasingly becoming an important component of Latino identity, in driving support for restrictionist policies and the minimal influence of nativity or language use. We also find that other components related to identity, such as beliefs about discrimination, correlate strongly with immigration attitudes. Our results underscore the complexity of Latino public opinion and the countervailing factors that result from various identities among Latinos regarding immigration policy.

Keywords

Latino immigration attitudes Latino identity Latino demographics immigration policy

The 2024 elections demonstrated that immigration continues to be a prominent issue in American politics. Donald Trump and the Republican Party invested significant resources in generating political messaging about the invasion of migrants, the smuggling of fentanyl across the southern border, and the loss of American jobs to undocumented migrants. While Kamala Harris and Democrats attempted to counter the Republican narrative about immigration, the candidate—who was inextricably tied to the Biden administration—and the party failed to convince voters that they could solve what had become the public consensus of a “crisis at the border.” Seizing on concerns about the economy, which Republicans directly connected to immigration, the GOP won the presidency, took back the Senate, and maintained a majority in the House of Representatives, giving them full control of the federal government. At the state and local level, initiatives and candidates tied to stricter immigration enforcement also found success at the ballot box.

Immediately after Donald Trump took office in January 2025 for his second term, he issued numerous aggressive immigration-related executive orders, including ending birthright citizenship for children born to undocumented mothers and requiring undocumented immigrants to register and be fingerprinted (Ainsley et al. 2025). Additionally, his administration took swift action to station National Guard troops and create military installations at the southern border (Goitein and Nunn 2025). Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has engaged in raids throughout the country and deported individuals to third countries where they have no ties (Silva and Martinez 2025). While President Trump has lost support for his handling of immigration, nearly 8 in 10 Republicans continue to approve of his policies, while fewer than 10 percent of Democrats express similar levels of approval (AP-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research 2026).

Differences over immigration policies are often framed and explored through a partisan lens. However, much less attention is given to the immigration policy preferences of heterogeneous groups, especially a group like Latinos, who have been the face of the immigration debate and who are often assumed to be supportive of progressive immigration policies.¹

Over the past generation, the immigration landscape and Latino demographics in the United States have shifted on several fronts. First, from 2009 to 2018, Asians overtook Latinos as the largest group entering the United States, but since 2019 that pattern has reversed again, mostly driven by undocumented migrants (Moslimani and Passel 2024). Second, the overall growth in the U.S. Latino population is not due to undocumented migrants, but rather to nativity. Nearly two-thirds of Latinos are native-born (Moslimani and Noe-Bustamante 2023)—a complete shift from a generation ago when increases in the Latino population were mostly a result of immigration. Third, and as a direct result of the shift in nativity, Latinos are now mainly bilingual or English-dominant in their language proficiency (Krogstad et al. 2015). Despite these factors, discourse about and media coverage of immigration continue to be centered around Latinos (Huo et al. 2018). These demographic changes signal a potential shift in how we consider Latino identity that could have important implications for Latinos’ immigration policy preferences. Furthermore, the changes and resulting immigration preferences seem to be politically consequential, since the last few election cycles have seen the Republican Party make inroads with Latinos, especially in states and districts along the southern border.

Current work provides a fruitful foundation in our understanding of factors that affect Latino attitudes about immigration. However, the literature remains limited due to a lack of comprehensive data on Latino public opinion. Studies are constrained by the number of respondents for specific subgroups, the limited cross-sectional nature of the samples, or the outdated time frame in which Latinos were surveyed. The current state of the immigration debate includes news and images about ICE raids and deportation flights that came on the heels of $170 billion funding allocation by the Republican-led Congress over the remaining Trump presidency for border and interior enforcement (O’Herron 2025.) Tough immigration enforcement—along with the up-and-down-the-ballot wins by Republicans in the 2024 elections, increased Latino support for Republicans, and significant political polarization—makes it even more important to engage in a contemporary and comprehensive examination of Latino immigration attitudes. This examination is warranted not only by the growing diversity of Latino identities but also by the ways in which evolving immigration contexts intersect with public opinion.

In this paper, we use more recent data on Latino public opinion to provide a comprehensive overview of contemporary Latino attitudes about immigration in an era with a changing demographic landscape defined by polarization. We utilize data from the Nationscape survey (Tausanovitch and Vavreck 2020), a multi-wave survey of almost 500,000 respondents (∼6,000 respondents per week) conducted from July 2019 to February 2021. This large sample allows us to generate a sizeable subsample of Latino respondents (N = 66,912) that permits us to explore the effects of a range of theoretically informed identity variables—including group favorability, perceptions of discrimination, immigration status, country of origin, and political attitudes—on variation in immigration attitudes among this group. Our empirical results demonstrate that, consistent with changes in Latino identity, Latinos hold a diversity of attitudes about restrictionist and permissive immigration policies, which in turn are conditioned upon several factors such as nativity status, country of origin, language use, group perceptions, and strength of partisanship and ideology. Our large dataset allows us to move prior findings on Latino public opinion forward by analyzing the effects of these competing—and often countervailing—factors in conjunction with one another to understand attitudes toward immigration across this diverse and rapidly changing demographic.

Our results both align with and challenge previous findings in the literature, demonstrating that Latinos have diverse identities and thus a complicated relationship with immigration policy. First, we find that partisanship and political ideology are independent determinants of restrictive policy attitudes. Conservative and Republican Latinos are more likely to support restrictive policy, while we find no effects of Democratic partisanship and liberal political ideology on policy preferences. Second, nativity has limited influence on Latino immigration attitudes. Foreign-born Latinos and those who primarily speak Spanish at home are only slightly less supportive of restrictionist policies than U.S.-born Latinos. Third, group perceptions are important factors in shaping Latinos’ immigration policy preferences. Latinos with favorable views toward immigrant-dominant groups (e.g., Latinos, Asians, Muslims, undocumented immigrants) are much less supportive of restrictionist immigration policies. Further, Latinos who perceive discrimination against majority groups (i.e., non-Hispanic whites, men, Christians) are more likely to support restrictive policies, while those recognizing discrimination against historically marginalized and minority groups (e.g., Latinos, Blacks, women) oppose them. These findings have meaningful implications for how the saliency of varying identities affects the way Latinos think about immigration and how political parties frame the issue in both national and state policy contexts.

Theoretical Underpinnings of Latinos’ Attitudes About Immigration

Over the last several decades, researchers have explored the effects of individual and contextual factors in determining variation in Latino immigration attitudes. We move this literature forward by examining the effects of several theoretically motivated variables that consider changing Latino demographics and shifting immigration contexts. Previous scholars (e.g., Rouse et al. 2010) developed a framework for modeling competing theories about Latino immigration attitudes based on clusters of independent variables that predict support for both restrictionist and permissive immigration policies. Applying this framework to account for contemporary factors, we contend that exploring an evolving, diverse Latino identity helps us better understand this group’s contemporary attitudes toward immigration policy.

The Importance of Identities on Latinos’ Immigration Attitudes

Identities have a crucial bearing on how individuals see themselves in relation to their communities, as well as the broader connection they feel toward other groups (Huddy and Khatib 2007). Furthermore, while individuals bring their unique perspectives in formulating political attitudes, these attitudes are also affected by group associations (Tajfel and Turner 1979); these associations create a sense of belonging to an in-group, while groups with which individuals do not share an attachment are viewed as out-groups. Group belonging often leads members to support the message of their in-group and refuse the message of the out-group, even if the out-group message is based on documented evidence (Esposo et al. 2013; Ross and Rouse 2020). Research has leveraged concepts of social identity and social identity complexity—that is, holding multiple identities—to show that there are complex identity structures determined by the degree of overlap in the groups to which an individual belongs (Roccas and Brewer 2002). Latino attitudes toward politics, and particularly immigration, are closely tied to identity. For example, Garcia-Rios et al. (2018) contend that responses to political issues or political attacks not only depend on the strength of identity with a group but also shared social categories across an “identity portfolio” (e.g., more salient identities play a larger role and are more easily politicized).

As previous research demonstrates, Latino identity is a result of diverse factors, including nativity, language use, strength of national-origin ties, perceptions of group positioning, and strength of American identity (Hickel et al. 2020; Masuoka 2008). Literature on Latino attitudes and behavior has often operationalized Latino identity with two related, but distinct concepts: linked fate and group consciousness. Linked fate is the extent to which individuals within the Latino community believe their own political, economic, and social fortunes are tied to the outcomes of the larger Latino community (e.g., Sanchez and Masuoka 2010). Relatedly, Latino group consciousness is a sense of belonging with the broader, pan-ethnic community within the United States, regardless of other identity factors (e.g., Sanchez 2006). Importantly, both linked fate and group consciousness, while correlated with in-group identity, are not the same; instead, they may be best understood as outcomes that can influence political attitudes but do not activate group identity processes (Pérez and Cobain 2024). Feelings of linked fate and group consciousness among Latinos are often situational, uneven, and activated by external political threats, like immigration (García-Rios et al. 2018; Vicuña et al. 2022). The increasing heterogeneity of Latino identity, which is less anchored to the immigration experience and the Spanish language, complicates the ability of concepts like group consciousness and linked fate to describe Latino political behavior (Beltrán 2010; Marsh and Ramírez 2019).

For this reason, we extend work on the effects of disparate in-group identities on immigration attitudes by disaggregating the evolving components that comprise Latino identity. In doing so, we contend that factors such as nativity, immigration and generational status, partisanship, ideology, group affinity, and social positioning in the United States are part of an “identity portfolio” that helps explain Latino political preferences and contemporary attitudes about immigration.

Nativity, Immigration, and Generational Status

Past work has offered explanations for variation in Latino attitudes toward immigration policies and considered the effects of nativity, immigration, and generational status (Kehrberg et al. 2025). These explanations often lean on the extent to which Latinos are perceived to be acculturated or assimilated into a new society (Abrajano and Alvarez 2010). Both processes explain the degree by which groups adapt to a new culture, with the former referring to conforming to new cultural traits while retaining some original cultural identity, while the latter is complete integration into the dominant culture (Citrin et al. 2007). Acculturation and assimilation can be effectively understood through a social identity lens as processes by which individuals (re)evaluate their in-group and out-group positioning. As Latinos become more acculturated or assimilated into American culture, the salience of their ethnic or national origin identities may decrease, resulting in a different perception of their social positioning and thereby, different opinions related to immigration.

Scholars have shown that first-generation (foreign-born) Latinos are less integrated, based on such factors as age at time of immigration, feelings toward their native country, language ability, and language use (Branton 2007). More recent, less-integrated immigrants tend to be more supportive of pro-immigration policies due to their own immigration experiences and transnational ties (Branton 2007; Miller et al. 1984). Related to this, more recent immigrants also tend to have direct experiences navigating restrictive, complicated immigration procedures and tend to have family in their country of origin who could benefit from more permissive immigration policies (Jones-Correa et al. 2007).

As subsequent immigrant generations lose their ties to the family’s country of origin, they tend to become rooted in U.S. culture and adopt mainstream views on politics and policy (Jones-Correa et al. 2007). Policy preferences on immigration illustrate this point: later generation Latinos generally favor more restrictive immigration policies, adopting the political preferences of dominant groups in society (Branton 2007; Rouse et al. 2010; Stringer 2018). As Latinos become more integrated into American society with each subsequent generation, they may be exposed to increasingly diverse social groups with political perspectives that differ from their own, influencing Latinos to become more conservative than their co-ethnics (de la Garza and Cortina 2007). Given this, we expect attitudes toward immigration to be conditioned by nativity in the United States, with first-generation Latinos expected to hold more permissive views toward immigration policy and Latinos who are removed from the immigration generation and experience expected to hold more restrictive immigration policy views.

Immigration status similarly has a bearing on Latino attitudes toward immigration, though due to varying forms of immigration status, findings on the topic remain mixed. On the one hand, the difficulties associated with navigating the complicated immigration system in the United States might foster feelings of solidarity-group association among immigrants, meaning that immigrants may hold less restrictionist views on immigration policy (Just and Anderson 2014). On the other hand, a desire to integrate into American society may increase dominant group identity and diminish feelings of kinship among immigrants navigating these complex systems (Just and Anderson 2014). Given these considerations, we arrive at the following hypotheses related to nativity, generation, and immigration status:

Foreign-born Latinos will be less supportive of restrictive immigration policy compared to second- and subsequent generation Latinos.

Latinos who are further removed from the immigrant experience are more likely to support restrictive immigration policy than Latinos who are closer to the immigrant experience.

Partisanship and Ideology

The effects of political attitudes—particularly partisanship and political ideology—on Latino immigration attitudes are less clear, with previous research generating mixed findings. Restrictionist immigration policies have usually been associated with Republican and conservative political preferences, with Democrats and liberals less supportive of immigration restriction (Homola 2021). While previous scholarship finds that Latinos tend to be more aligned with the Democratic party overall (de la Garza 2004; Huddy et al. 2016), the effect of partisanship on immigration attitudes is often inconsistent and dependent on particular policy platforms championed by individual candidates (Cisneros 2017; Wakefield 2025), as suggested by voting patterns from the 2024 presidential election. Some Latinos who generally tend to be more aligned with the Democratic Party may hold more conservative views on specific policy issues, such as abortion, immigration, and the economy, and thus may occasionally act as single-issue voters on these issues (Cisneros 2017). This means that Latinos may not always consistently vote for a single party, making partisan attachments a less powerful predictor of stances on individual policy issues such as immigration. Inconsistent attachment between Democratic Latinos and liberal immigration policy also reflects recent trends among Democratic partisans more generally, with Democrats being more divided on the topic of immigration as compared to Republicans (Ollerenshaw and Jardina 2023).

Among Republican Latinos, the effect of partisan identity on anti-immigrant policy preferences tends to be straightforward, with recent works confirming that Latinos who are conservative and Republican are more likely to support restrictive immigration policies (Stringer 2018). Rouse et al. (2010) find no significant differences among Republican, Independent, and Democratic Latinos in their support for permissive immigration policies. However, the study was conducted in a less partisan and polarized era that did not evaluate partisanship as an overarching social identity, as is the case in the contemporary political environment (West and Iyengar 2022). For Latinos this means that, whereas prior work indicates mixed findings regarding the relationship between partisanship, ideology, and attitudes toward immigrants, partisan and ideological identities may be playing an increasingly salient role in a polarized political era. As partisanship and ideology become key components of identity among Latinos, these views may begin to map onto and reflect mainstream (i.e., white Americans) partisan and ideological attitudes toward immigration. Therefore, we might expect partisanship and political ideology to play a significant role in explaining Latino preferences for restrictionist immigration policies in ways that align with historic partisan trends regarding immigration preferences.

Democratic-leaning Latinos will be more likely to oppose restrictive immigration policies compared to Republican-leaning Latinos.

Liberal-leaning Latinos will be more likely to oppose restrictive immigration policies compared to conservative-leaning Latinos.

Group Perceptions and Social Positioning

As with other components that comprise Latino identity, we suggest that group perceptions and social positioning, as defined by social identity theory (Huddy 2001; Tajfel 1981), help us better understand Latinos’ contemporary attitudes toward immigration policy. This theory suggests that individuals draw a line between groups they belong to (“in-groups”) and groups they don’t belong to (“out-groups”). Members of the in-group are likely to develop a sense of connection and trust for fellow in-group members but a sense of distrust for members of the out-group, and in-group identities are strengthened to the extent that the out-group is perceived as a threat (Brewer 1999; Qi and Garand 2024). Because group boundaries are continuously redrawn, Latinos may come to view other immigrant-dominant groups as sharing similar social, political, or racialized experiences within the United States. To the extent that Latinos perceive these groups as part of a broader shared “in-group,” they may develop more favorable attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. Consequently, Latinos with favorable views toward immigrant-dominant groups (e.g., fellow Latinos, Asians) will likely be less supportive of restrictionist immigration policies, while those with unfavorable views toward these groups will likely be more supportive.

Part of the American identity story relates to how Latinos and other Americans perceive patterns of discrimination against both members of dominant groups (e.g., Whites, men, Christians) and members of marginalized and/or minority groups (e.g., Latinos, Blacks, women). Previous research finds that Americans differ in terms of which groups they perceive to be the victims of discrimination in American society (Garand and Magaña 2022). This work also shows that Americans’ perceptions against marginalized groups coalesce to form a coherent scale of anti-minority discrimination perceptions, while a similar scale is observed for perceptions of discrimination against dominant groups. Many Americans perceive that various historically marginalized groups are the primary victims of discrimination, but the degree to which this perception is held depends on the way individuals socially categorize others into in-groups and out-groups (Banfield and Dovidio 2013). On the other hand, other Americans perceive that historically dominant groups are now the primary victims of discrimination in the United States (Craig and Richeson 2017; Rouse and Telhami 2022).

Patterns of perceived discrimination are related to color-blind ideology and the denial of racism, both of which minimize or reject racial inequality, and which emphasize the belief that success is predicated on individual effort (Neville et al. 2013). Consistent with this perspective, individuals who believe that minority groups are not subject to discrimination may be more likely to view society as post-racial and evaluate immigrants through an individualist lens, such as whether they are hardworking, law-abiding, and deserving (Sears and Henry 2003). This may lead to the view that immigrants’ challenges are self-inflicted, fostering more support for restrictionist immigration policies. However, if someone believes minority groups face discrimination, they recognize a hierarchy where those groups are disadvantaged and therefore may view restrictive immigration policies unfavorably.

We suggest that Latinos who perceive high levels of discrimination against historically dominant groups may express racial resentment because of concerns about the loss of status and traditional sense of American identity (Tesler 2016). Hence, these respondents will be more likely to support restrictionist immigration policies. On the other hand, Latinos who perceive high levels of discrimination against historically marginalized groups will be concerned about possible threats to immigrant-dominant groups and will express sympathy via their opposition to restrictionist immigration policies. Given these perceptions of discrimination, we expect to find the following:

Latinos who perceive that historically marginalized communities suffer from discrimination will be less likely to support restrictionist immigration policy compared to those who perceive that historically dominant groups suffer from discrimination.

Country/Region of Origin

Literature on Latinos in the United States often focuses on country-of-origin as an important source of identity formation, as it offers boundaries for who belongs within the in-group. These country-of-origin identities tie individuals together through cultural markers such as shared language patterns, customs, religion, and migration histories (Kelly and Kelly 2005). In the U.S. context, country of origin among Latinos may have practical implications for acculturation and assimilation, given that U.S. immigration policy has historically advantaged some groups over others due to foreign policy concerns (Knoll 2012). For example, for decades Cubans benefited from policies such as the Cuban Adjustment Act and the practice of being paroled into the United States, which granted them a relatively streamlined path toward legal status, and ultimately, citizenship. In contrast, Latinos from other countries, particularly those from Central America, have faced more restrictive immigration enforcement due to programs such as expedited removal, Migrant Protection Protocols, and Zero-Tolerance, all of which curtail the rights of migrants. These institutional differences affect the resources, rights, and sense of belonging among Latinos from different countries and may influence identity and, ultimately, political opinion formation in the United States, especially related to immigration policy (Branton 2007). Due to these country-of-origin differences, Latinos from different countries may hold differing political opinions (Abrajano and Singh 2009; Rouse et al. 2010).

However, country of origin status has had limited value in helping explain Latinos’ immigration attitudes for several reasons. First, there are not clear theoretically based differences between certain countries, like Peru and Colombia—countries that are from the same region and whose citizens share similar constraints as a result of the U.S. immigration system—that would lead to varying opinions about immigration. The lack of disaggregated data has also limited the ability to systematically explore variation across countries. Therefore, we cluster some countries based on regions, while examining others individually, due to their unique experience with U.S. immigration (e.g., Cuba).

Data and Methods

To explore the social identity-based determinants of Latinos’ immigration attitudes, we use data from the Nationscape surveys, a series of rolling cross-sectional surveys sponsored by the Democracy Fund (Tausanovitch and Vavreck 2020). The Nationscape project involves 77 weekly surveys of approximately 6,000 survey respondents each week, conducted from July 2019 to February 2021. The total sample size across the 77 weeks of surveys is N = 465,297. This yields a very large subsample of Latino respondents (N = 66,912) that we can use to estimate statistical models of Latinos’ attitudes toward immigration. The Nationscape surveys include a comprehensive battery of immigration policy questions; some of which are asked in all 77 weeks of surveys, while others are asked only in subsets of weeks. With missing data for some variables, our overall sample size is reduced to N = 37,043. The Nationscape surveys are a rich data source for exploring how Americans think about immigration, and the substantial sample size means that there are large subsamples of politically relevant groups, including Latinos.

Dependent Variable

To measure Latino immigration attitudes, we rely on four items included in all 77 survey waves: (1) support for building a border wall; (2) support for deporting all undocumented immigrants; (3) support for providing a path to citizenship for Dreamers; and (4) support for providing a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants. All four of these variables are measured on a three-point scale, ranging from 0 (respondent disagrees with proposed policy) to 2 (respondent agrees). We use principal component factor analysis to combine these four variables into an immigration policy scale (Eigenvalue = 2.283, variance explained = 0.571), with all four factor loadings of at least 0.72. Two of these variables are measured in a pro-immigration direction and the other two are measured in the anti-immigration direction, but the resulting factor score is measured in the direction of support for restrictionist immigration policies.

Independent Variables

How Latinos might think about immigration can be somewhat complicated as Latinos balance (1) their U.S. experience and ties to the American political, social, and economic culture with (2) any experiences or ties that they might have with the political, social, and economic culture of their home countries or the country-of-origin of parents, grandparents, or earlier generations of family members. Immigration attitudes may also be driven by self-interest concerns (e.g., economic status, market conditions), as well as a range of political attitudes and perceptions. Here, we model Latinos’ immigration attitudes as a function of political identity, group favorability and perceptions of discrimination, and variables that include nativity, region of origin,² generational and immigration status, and language, as well as several socioeconomic and demographic attributes that have been shown to affect attitudes about immigration.

Political Identity Variables

We suggest that Latinos’ attitudes toward immigration should be influenced by their partisan and ideological attachments. We include two variables representing partisan identification: (1) Republican partisan strength, ranging from 0 (pure independents or Democrats) to 3 (strong Republicans); and (2) Democratic partisan strength, ranging from 0 (pure independents and Republicans) to 3 (strong Democrats). Independent leaners are coded as 1 in each scale. The effect of being a pure independent is found when both partisan strength variables are equal to 0.³ We include these two variables—instead of the traditional seven-point partisan identification scale—to capture the possibility that the effect of partisan strength will differ for Democratic and Republican identifiers. Likewise, we include two variables representing respondents’ ideological identification: (1) conservative ideological strength, ranging from 0 (for moderates and liberals) to 3 (for strong conservatives); and (2) liberal ideological strength, ranging from 0 (for moderates and conservatives) to 3 (for strong liberals). We expect that Republican and conservative Latinos will be more likely to favor restrictive immigration policies, so the coefficients for Republican partisan strength and conservative ideological strength are expected to be positive. On the other hand, we expect that Latinos who are Democrats and/or liberals will be less likely to support restrictive immigration policies.

In-Group and Out-Group Variables

We suggest that how individuals think about immigrants and/or groups with large immigrant subpopulations will have a strong effect on how they think about immigration policy in general. If immigrants and immigrant-dominated groups are viewed unfavorably, Latinos will be more likely to support restrictionist immigration policies. Given this, we include in our models items measuring individuals’ level of favorability or unfavorability toward four groups: (1) Latinos; (2) Asians; (3) Muslims; and (4) undocumented immigrants. Each of these groups is either an immigrant group (i.e., undocumented immigrants) or has a large share of members who are first-, second-, or third-generation immigrants. These variables are measured on a four-point scale, ranging from 0 (very unfavorable) to 3 (very favorable).

Another important component of identity is the degree to which individuals perceive that groups are targeted for discrimination. If, for instance, Latinos perceive that they or other Latinos are subject to discrimination by out-groups based on their ethnicity, this will generate a threat response that may magnify their self-identity and promote more favorable views toward immigration. The Nationscape dataset includes a series of questions about respondents’ perceptions of discrimination against a range of groups, but (regrettably) the items are included in only a limited number of survey waves. Therefore, we cannot include perceptions of discrimination against Latinos and Asians in our models.

Instead, we opt for an approach co-developed by one of the authors which shows that minority/majority group perceptions of discrimination coalesce to form separate factors that represent respondents’ general perceptions of discrimination against each group. Indeed, these findings show that perceptions of discrimination against Latinos and Asians load very strongly on a marginalized discrimination factor that includes perceptions of discrimination against women, Blacks, Muslims, gays and lesbians, and transgender people (Garand and Magaña 2022). We adopt this approach here, creating a variable for perceptions of marginalized/minority discrimination using discrimination perceptions toward Blacks, Muslims, and women (Eigenvalue = 2.13, variance explained = 0.710). We also create a variable for perceptions of discrimination against dominant groups by using discrimination perceptions toward Whites, Christians, and men (Eigenvalue = 2.13, variance explained = 0.710). Each of the discrimination items used to create the general marginalized/minority and dominant/majority factor scores is measured on a five-point scale, ranging from 0 (respondent perceives no discrimination at all) to 4 (respondent perceives a great deal of discrimination). We expect perceptions of marginalized/minority discrimination to have a negative effect on support for restrictionist immigration policies, while perceptions of dominant/majority discrimination will have a positive effect.

Since Latinos (and their family members) from different countries or regions may have had different immigration and cultural experiences, we include a series of dichotomous variables representing family country or region of origin; each of these variables is coded 1 for respondents either from or with family ties from each country or region, and 0 otherwise. We include specific country variables for Cuba, the U.S. territory of Puerto Rico, and Spain, as well as separate variables for respondents from or with family ties to South American countries (i.e., Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Peru), Central American countries (i.e., El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama), and a catch-all variable for respondents from other countries. We use Mexico as the excluded country-of-origin contrast.

Generational Status and Language Use

Generational status may have important effects on how Latinos think about restrictionist immigration policies. One might expect that Latinos who are first-generation immigrants—that is, were born in another country—would be particularly less likely to support restrictionist immigration policies. Moreover, Latinos who speak Spanish or another foreign language are likely to have retained some connection to the immigrant generation and to the culture and traditions of their country-of-origin or the ancestral country of their family. To capture these possible effects, we include three variables in our model: (1) foreign-born status, coded 1 for respondents born in another country, and 0 otherwise; (2) Spanish language, coded 1 for respondents who report that they speak Spanish at home, and 0 otherwise; and (3) foreign language, coded 1 for respondents who report that they speak a foreign language (not Spanish) at home, and 0 otherwise. We include the non-Spanish language binary to account for the fact that those who speak a language other than English at home may be immigrants or closely related to immigrants. These respondents may also hold a sympathetic view toward immigrants due to their proximity to the immigration experience. For the two language variables the excluded contrast group is comprised of Latinos who report that they speak English at home. We expect that all three variables will be negatively related to support for restrictionist immigration policies.

Control Variables

We include a series of theoretically informed control variables across our models—education, income, evaluations of the economy, employment, union membership, education, gender, and age—which have previously been determined to influence attitudes on immigration (Borjas 2003; Citrin et al. 1997; Garand et al. 2017; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). A full description of these variables is found in the Online Supplemental Material, Appendix 1.

Empirical Results

In Table 1, we present OLS regression estimates for our model of Latinos’ attitudes toward restrictionist immigration policies. Because these data are collected in 77 waves over a period of about 18 months, we include fixed effects for each of the survey waves. We also report the predicted values on the dependent variable associated with the lowest and highest values on each independent variable, as well as the difference in those predicted values; this provides a sense of the relative importance of the independent variables in the model. The model fits the data reasonably well, with an R² value of 0.4394 (F = 275.72, prob <0.0001).⁴

Table 1.

OLS estimates for model of Latinos’ attitudes toward restrictionist immigration policies, 2019–2021 Nationscape survey

	b	z	Predicted values
	b	z	Minimum	Maximum	Difference
Political attitudes
Republican party strength	0.117	24.23***	−0.351	0.001	0.352
Democratic party strength	−0.003	−0.78	−0.351	−0.360	−0.009
Conservative ideological strength	0.124	17.16***	−0.309	0.064	0.373
Liberal ideological strength	0.003	0.48	−0.309	−0.301	0.008
Identity variables
Favorability: Hispanics	−0.007	−1.37	−0.253	−0.275	−0.022
Favorability: Asians	0.010	1.98*	−0.294	−0.263	0.031
Favorability: Muslims	−0.021	−4.39***	−0.231	−0.293	−0.062
Favorability: undocumented immigrants	−0.221	−50.24***	0.134	−0.527	−0.661
Perceptions of minority discrimination	−0.217	−49.68***	0.349	−0.525	−0.874
Perceptions of majority discrimination	0.186	48.64***	−0.544	0.165	0.709
Immigration status/language
Foreign born	−0.069	−6.26***	−0.261	−0.330	−0.069
Spanish language at home	−0.032	−3.97***	−0.263	−0.295	−0.032
Other foreign language at home	0.073	5.43***	−0.263	−0.190	0.073
Socioeconomic variables
Education	0.004	−1.89*	−0.252	−0.287	−0.035
Household income	0.001	1.39	−0.278	−0.259	0.019
Retrospective national economy	0.128	24.33***	−0.373	−0.117	0.256
Unemployed	−0.019	−1.47	−0.269	−0.288	−0.019
Union member	0.105	9.29***	−0.286	−0.181	0.105
Demographic variables
Gender: woman	0.008	1.06	−0.276	−0.268	0.008
Race: Black	0.091	6.84***	−0.271	−0.180	0.091
Race: Asian	0.065	3.48***	−0.271	−0.207	0.064
Race: other race	−0.033	−3.82***	−0.271	−0.304	−0.033
Age	0.002	8.23***	−0.313	−0.123	0.190
Country/region/territory of origin
Region of origin: South America	0.022	1.67	−0.279	−0.258	0.022
Region of origin: Central America	−0.031	−1.60	−0.279	−0.311	−0.032
Country of origin: Cuba	0.052	3.10***	−0.279	−0.227	0.052
Country of origin: Puerto Rico	−0.005	−0.22	−0.279	−0.284	−0.005
Country of origin: Spain	0.021	1.29	−0.279	−0.258	0.021
Country of origin: other country	0.025	2.33**	−0.279	−0.254	0.025
N	37,043
R²	0.4394
F	275.72
Prob(F)	0.0000

Note. We report the predicted values for the minimum and maximum values of each independent variable, holding the other independent variables constant at their means. The difference column represents the difference between the predicted values for the maximum and minimum values on each independent variable. This model is estimated with fixed effects for each of the 77 waves in the Nationscape surveys.

***prob <0.001 **prob <0.01 *prob <0.05.

Political Identity Variables

Turning first to our political variables, we find strong effects of Republican partisan strength and conservative ideological strength on support for restrictionist immigration policies, but (surprisingly) we do not find commensurate counter-effects of Democratic partisan strength and liberal ideological strength. As Latinos move in a Republican partisan direction, they are considerably more likely to support restrictionist immigration policies (b = 0.117, z = 24.23) but increases in Democratic partisan strength have a null effect on immigration attitudes (b = −0.003, z = −0.78). The effect of political ideology is similarly one-sided. As Latinos move in the conservative direction, they are once again more likely to support restrictionist immigration policies (b = 0.124, z = 17.16), but the effect of liberal ideological strength on immigration attitudes is negligible and statistically nonsignificant (b = 0.003, z = 0.48). These findings suggest that there is an asymmetry in the effects of political identity, with Latino Republicans and conservatives demonstrating clear support for restrictionist immigration policies, while Democrats and liberals are indistinguishable from moderates.

The contrasting effects of partisanship and political ideology are detailed in Figures 1 (for partisanship) and 2 (for political ideology). In Figure 1, we show how increases in Republican partisan strength (right side of figure) and increases in Democratic partisan strength (left side) are translated into immigration attitudes. As one can see, there is a strong effect for Republican partisan strength. Moving from 0 (pure Independents) to 3 (strong Republican), there is a shift in the predicted score on the immigration policy scale of 0.352 (i.e., from −0.351 to 0.001), controlling for the effects of other variables in the model. On the other hand, there is no discernible effect of Democratic partisan strength, with a shift of only −0.009 (i.e., from −0.351 to −0.360). While Democratic Latinos exhibit overall lower support for restrictionist immigration policies than Republicans, the partisan strength effects that do occur are limited to Republicans. A similar pattern is observed for the influence of political ideology. In Figure 2, we see that the effect of conservative ideological strength for Latinos is quite strong, with movement from pure moderate to strong conservative resulting in a shift in support for restrictionist immigration policies of 0.373 (i.e., from −0.309 to +0.064). However, similar to the findings on partisan strength, we find that liberal ideological strength is unrelated to immigration attitudes, with a shift from pure moderate to strong liberal resulting in a shift in the restrictionist immigration policy scale of only 0.008 (i.e., from −3.09 to −3.01). Overall, Latino restrictionist immigration attitudes become stronger with increases in Republican partisan identification and conservative ideological strength but are not reduced as Democratic partisan identification and liberal ideological identification increase.

Figure 1.

Relationship between Republican/Democratic strength and immigration restriction scale, 2019–2021 Nationscape data.

Figure 2.

Relationship between conservative/liberal ideological strength and immigration restriction scale, 2019–2021 Nationscape data.

In-Group and Out-Group Variables

Our cluster of group identity variables includes some of the strongest effects in our model, but there are also some unexpected null results. First, we hypothesize that how Latinos evaluate racial/ethnic groups with a strong immigration presence (i.e., Hispanics, Asians) will have a strong negative effect on support for restrictionist immigration policies. However, we find that neither favorable evaluations for Hispanics (b = −0.007, z = −1.37) nor favorable evaluations for Asians (b = 0.010, z = 1.98) have the expected significant negative effect on restrictionist immigration attitudes. In particular, we would have expected that how Latinos evaluate their own ethnic group would represent strong in-group identity and would hence promote opposition to restrictionist immigration policies, yet we find only a null effect.

On the other hand, two variables representing evaluations of immigrant-dominant groups have strong negative effects on support for restrictionist immigration policies. We find that Latinos’ favorability toward Muslims has a discernible (but modest) effect on the dependent variable (b = −0.021, z = −4.39) that surpasses conventional levels of statistical significance. More importantly, we find that Latinos’ evaluations of undocumented immigrants have a powerful negative effect on support for restrictionist immigration policies (b = −0.221, z = −50.24); across the 0–3 range of this variable, Latinos shift their support for restrictionist immigration policies by −0.661, which represents approximately 21 percent of the range of the dependent variable. Clearly, Latinos who have favorable views toward undocumented immigrants are significantly less likely to support restrictionist immigration policies.

The strongest identity-based determinants of Latinos’ immigration policy attitudes in our models relate to individuals’ perceptions of discrimination against marginalized/minority groups and dominant/majority groups. We find that perceptions of minority discrimination have a powerful negative effect on Latinos’ support for restrictionist immigration policies (b = −0.217, z = −49.68). Simply, Latinos who perceive that marginalized/minority groups (i.e., Blacks, Muslims, and women) are subject to substantial discrimination are considerably less likely to support restrictionist immigration policies than Latinos who perceive little discrimination against these groups.

On the other hand, there is a very strong counter response among Latinos who perceive that members of historically dominant/majority groups are targeted for discrimination. We find that perceptions of discrimination against dominant/majority groups (i.e., whites, Christians, and men) are strongly and positively related to support for restrictionist immigration policies (b = 0.186, z = 48.64). Latinos who perceive that historically dominant groups are subject to discrimination are substantially more likely to support restrictionist immigration policies. This is in line with previous research that demonstrates that changes in the demographic attributes of the American population have resulted in a counter-response whereby many Americans are threatened by the perception that the role of historically dominant groups is being diminished. What is interesting is that many Latinos appear to share these perceptions and translate those perceptions into support for restrictionist immigration policies. This may indicate an evolving identity among Latinos, whereby some Latinos now relate more to historically dominant groups, and because of distance from the immigrant or marginalized experience they do not recognize a threat from restrictionist immigration policies (Fraga et al. 2025).

The counteracting effects of perceptions of marginalized/minority discrimination and perceptions of dominant/majority discrimination are illustrated in Figure 3, where we observe a crisscross pattern. For the minority discrimination scale, moving from the lowest to highest values on this variable results in a substantial shift in the immigration policy scale of −0.874 (from 0.349 to −0.525). On the other hand, moving from the lowest to highest value on the majority discrimination variable results in a positive shift of 0.709 (i.e., from −0.544 to 0.165) in Latinos’ position on the immigration policy scale. Since (1) the magnitude of the effect is stronger for the minority discrimination scale compared to the majority discrimination scale, and (2) more Latinos (53.4 percent) score above average on the minority discrimination scale than above the average on the majority discrimination scale (46.3 percent), it is likely that the cumulative effect of these two variables moves Latinos somewhat away from support for restrictionist immigration policies. However, both sets of discrimination perceptions have a major effect in shaping Latinos’ views toward immigration policies.

Figure 3.

Relationship between perceptions of minority/majority discrimination scales and immigration restriction scale, 2019–2021 Nationscape data.

We also include in our model variables that represent the country/region of origin of immigrant Latinos or the national heritage of Latinos born in the United States. Our country/region/territory-of-origin variables include separate variables for South American countries, Central American countries, Cuba, Spain, the U.S. territory of Puerto Rico, and a catch-all variable capturing the effects of Latinos from other countries. Mexico is the largest source of immigrants to the United States, so we exclude Mexico from the model as the contrast category. We find very few country effects, with only two coefficients (for Cuba and the “other” country variable) achieving conventional levels of statistical significance, and even for these countries, the effects on immigration policy attitudes are small. These results stand in some contrast to those of Rouse et al. (2010), who find several significant country/region effects in their models of immigration attitudes. It appears that country of origin effects are less influential in predicting contemporary Latino immigration attitudes.

Immigration Status and Language

We hypothesize that foreign-born Latinos will be significantly less supportive of restrictionist immigration policies, since all foreign-born individuals residing in the United States have had to deal with the immigration system. Further, we expect that Latinos who are sufficiently immersed in Spanish or another foreign language that they speak at home will have stronger connections to their cultural roots and thus will be considerably less supportive of immigration restrictions.

We find modest effects of these variables on immigration policy attitudes. Foreign-born status is, as expected, negatively related to support for restrictionist immigration policies (b = −0.069, z = −6.26), but this translates only into a small shift of −0.069 in the immigration policy scale. Latinos who were born in another country and immigrated to the United States are only slightly less supportive of immigration policy restrictions than native-born Latinos. Further, we find that Latinos who speak Spanish at home are less likely to support restrictionist immigration policies (b = −0.032, z = −3.97), but this is a very small effect. Interestingly, Latinos who speak a foreign language at home other than Spanish are significantly more likely to support immigration policy restrictions (b = 0.073, z = 5.43).

These findings of modest effects may reveal some level of ambivalent or mixed feelings among Latinos who have immigrated to the United States and/or who retain the language of their home country. Many Latinos may have come to the United States through legal means, and they may hold the view that other immigrants should follow the same practice; this view may generate a higher level of support for restrictionist immigration policies. For Latinos with connections to the undocumented community, there may be greater opposition to restrictionist immigration policies and greater support for permitting undocumented immigrants to remain in the country.

Conclusion

Immigration policy in the United States remains a controversial topic, especially among an increasingly diverse American electorate. Immigration played a pivotal role in the 2024 presidential election, with many voters citing immigration policy as a key reason in their support for Republican candidates. With an increasingly polarized society, understanding how different groups within the electorate react to immigration reform is important not only to candidates hoping to win votes, but also to policymakers and ordinary citizens alike who must deal with the consequences of the lack of immigration reform.

In this paper, we explore contemporary Latino attitudes toward immigration policy, providing insight on how roughly 20 percent of the American populace views this controversial topic. Although one might expect Latinos to hold overwhelmingly liberal attitudes toward immigration policy due to decades of scholarship on this topic, events like the 2024 presidential election demonstrate that this may no longer be the case. Changes in Latino identity and the composition of the Latino electorate necessitate a more nuanced examination of this issue. Where previously a majority of Latinos were foreign-born immigrants, in recent years that split has shifted, with nearly 70 percent of Latinos now U.S.-born citizens (Funk and Hugo Lopez 2022). Latino voters are also more educated with a higher income than in previous decades (Mora 2022). These demographic shifts warrant an updated look at Latino attitudes about immigration.

Previous scholarship has identified a variety of factors that explain attitudes about immigration, and in particular, Latino attitudes toward immigration reform. Given changing Latino demographics, we investigate whether these explanations for Latino attitudes hold considering this increasing diversity and in a hyperpolarized environment. Using Nationscape data—one of the largest U.S. public opinion datasets in existence—we examine attitudes toward restrictive immigration policy among over 30,000 Latinos, allowing us to more comprehensively delve into potential explanatory factors.

As part of this study, we report several findings that both align with and contrast previous findings. First, we find that the effects of political ideology and partisanship are one-sided. As Latinos become more Republican and/or conservative, they are more likely to support restrictionist policy. However, we find null effects when we consider how Democratic partisanship and liberal political ideology shape Latinos’ immigration attitudes, contrary to expectations and previous findings. Second, we find that nativity plays a less influential role on contemporary Latino immigration attitudes. Foreign-born Latinos are only slightly less supportive of restrictive immigration policy compared to other U.S.-born Latinos, with similar findings for those who predominantly speak Spanish at home. This points to the potential effects of changes in Latino demographics and reflects the cross-pressures that are influencing public opinion formation among this group. Third, we also find that identity and in-group and out-group dynamics play an important role in Latino attitudes toward immigration. Surprisingly, Latinos who hold favorable views toward Latinos and Asians are not significantly less supportive of restrictionist immigration policies, but we do find that favorable views toward Muslims and (especially) undocumented immigrants reduce support for these policies. Beliefs about discrimination are among the strongest correlates of restrictive immigration attitudes. Latinos who believe that majority groups—like non-Hispanic whites—tend to suffer from discrimination are more likely to support restrictive immigration policy, while those who believe that minority groups—such as Latinos—suffer from discrimination prefer the converse. Overall, Latinos’ views of the American social structure and how they relate to dominant or minority groups help us better understand attitudes about immigration policies among this group.

While the Nationscape data provide a unique opportunity to examine Latino immigration attitudes at an unprecedented scale, the data also come with several limitations. First, because Nationscape was a general data collection effort, it does not ask a comprehensive battery of questions that may be of specific relevance to the Latino community. As a result, we lack measures that directly ask Latinos about their identity, the strength of their identity, and how they prioritize these identities. This limits our ability to more deeply explore identity formation and prioritization. For example, while it may be the case that partisanship subsumes other forms of identity, we cannot test this directly.

Despite these limitations, we can leverage the substantial sample size to better understand Latino immigration attitudes, particularly in more contemporary times. However, future research should address outstanding questions. First, how do Latino identity, identity prioritization, colorism, and experiences with racism affect public opinion toward immigration policies? To what extent can processes like group consciousness and linked fate help us better understand contemporary Latino immigration attitudes in an era of extreme polarization? Future work should also adopt additional measures of political identity—for instance, measures of American identity, measures of the centrality of Latino self-identification, and strength of in-group associations, which will provide a fuller picture of how identities drive Latinos’ immigration policy views. Second, do Latinos who reside in communities with a strong Latino presence or with a large immigrant population have different immigration policy views than those who reside in communities with few Latinos and/or immigrants? What are the effects of local economic conditions on Latinos' views toward restrictionist immigration policies? Third, how do the effects of key independent variables vary across different groups of Latinos? Are the drivers of restrictionist immigration policies the same for native- and foreign-born Latinos, or for Latinos with strong American identity and those who identify strongly with their country of origin? This would involve the estimation of interaction models that account for how the effects of predictors of Latinos’ immigration policy positions vary by strength of identity and across other individual-level attributes. Answering these questions may further advance our understanding of the complicated loyalties Latinos maintain as this group’s identities and demographics continue to change.

Supplemental Material

Supplemental Material - Complicated Loyalties: Latino Attitudes About Immigration in an Era of Changing Identities and Demographics

Supplemental Material for Complicated Loyalties: Latino Attitudes About Immigration in an Era of Changing Identities and Demographics by Samantha Chapa, Stella M. Rouse, James C. Garand in Political Research Quarterly.

Supplemental Material

Supplemental Material - Complicated Loyalties: Latino Attitudes About Immigration in an Era of Changing Identities and Demographics

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

We extend our sincere thanks to Max Magaña, Álvaro Corral, Jake Haselswerdt, Marcel Roman, Marco Avina, Taeku Lee, Mashail Malik, Reed Rasband, Priyanka Sethy, Joshua Corona, Gilad Hurvitz, Maria Isabel Mosquera, Eman Jalal Alahmadi, Jaime Andres Carbajal, and Jacquelynn Hernandez.

ORCID iDs

Samantha Chapa

Stella M. Rouse

James C. Garand

Ethical Considerations

The data are secondary, observational data that were not collected by the authors. As such, the authors did not seek ethical or IRB approval.

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Data Availability Statement

The data are available upon request and in compliance with the journal’s replication requirements.*

Supplemental Material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Notes

References

Abrajano

Marisa A.

Alvarez

R. Michael

. 2010. New Faces, New Voices: The Hispanic Electorate in America. Princeton University Press.

Abrajano

Marisa

Singh

Simran

. 2009. “Examining the Link Between Issue Attitudes and News Source: the Case of Latinos and Immigration Reform.” Political Behavior 31 (1): 1–30.

Ainsley

Julia

Martinez

Didi

Stricker

Laura

. 2025. Trump Issues a Slew of immigration-related Executive Orders on First Day of New Term. NBC News. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/trump-issue-10-executive-orders-immigration-taking-office-rcna188385

AP-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research . 2026. Fewer Approve of Trump’s Handling of the Economy. https://apnorc.org/projects/fewer-approve-of-trumps-handling-of-the-economy/

Banfield

Jillian C.

Dovidio

John F.

. 2013. “Whites’ Perceptions of Discrimination Against Blacks: the Influence of Common Identity.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 49 (5): 833–41.

Beltrán

Cristina

. 2010. The Trouble with Unity: Latino Politics and the Creation of Identity. Oxford University Press.

Borjas

George J.

2003. “The Labor Demand Curve Is Downward Sloping: Reexamining the Impact of Immigration on the Labor Market.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(4): 1335–74.

Branton

Regina

. 2007. “Latino Attitudes Toward Various Areas of Public Policy.” Political Research Quarterly 60 (2): 293–303.

Brewer

Marilynn B

. 1999. “The Psychology of Prejudice: Ingroup Love and Outgroup Hate?” Journal of Social Issues 55 (3): 429–44.

10.

Cisneros

Angel Saavedra

. 2017. Latino Identity and Political Attitudes: Why are Latinos Not Republican? Springer.

11.

Citrin

Jack

Green

Donald P.

Muste

Christopher

Wong

Cara

. 1997. “Public Opinion Toward Immigration Reform: the Role of Economic Motivations.” The Journal of Politics 59 (3): 858–81.

12.

Citrin

Jack

Lerman

Amy

Murakami

Michael

Pearson

Kathryn

. 2007. “Testing Huntington: Is Hispanic Immigration a Threat to American Identity?” Perspectives on Politics 5 (1): 31–48.

13.

Craig

Maureen A.

Richeson

Jennifer A.

. 2017. “Information About the US Racial Demographic Shift Triggers Concerns About Anti-White Discrimination Among the Perspective White ‘Minority’.” PLoS One 12 (9): e0185389.

14.

de la Garza

Rodolfo O.

2004. “Latino Politics.” Annual Review of Political Science 7 (1): 91–123.

15.

de la Garza

Rodolfo O.

Cortina

Jeronimo

. 2007. “Are Latinos Republicans but Just Don’t Know it? The Latino Vote in the 2000 and 2004 Presidential Elections.” American Politics Research 35 (2): 202–23.

16.

Esposo

Sarah R.

Hornsby

Matthew J.

Spoor

Jennifer R.

. 2013. “Shooting the Messenger: Outsiders Critical of Your Group are Rejected Regardless of Argument Quality.” British Journal of Social Psychology 52 (2): 386–95.

17.

Fraga

Bernard L.

Velez

Yamil R.

West

Emily A.

. 2025. “Reversion to the Mean or Their Version of the Dream? Latino Voting in the Age Populism.” American Political Science Review 119 (1): 1–9.

18.

Funk

Cary

Hugo Lopez

Mark

. 2022. A Brief Statistical Portrait of U.S. Hispanics. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2022/06/14/a-brief-statistical-portrait-of-u-s-hispanics/

19.

Garand

James C.

Magaña

Max

. 2022. “Competing for Victimhood: Perceptions of Anti-Majority Discrimination, Perceptions of Anti-Minority Discrimination, and the 2016-2020 Presidential Elections.” In Paper Presented at the 2022 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 2022, Chicago, IL.

20.

Garand

James C.

Ping

Davis

Belinda C.

. 2017. “Immigration Attitudes and Support for the Welfare State in the American Mass Public.” American Journal of Political Science 61 (1): 146–62.

21.

García-Rios

Sergio

Pedraza

Francisco

Wilcox Archuleta

Bryan

. 2018. “Direct and Indirect Xenophobic Attacks: Unpacking Portfolios of Identity.” Political Behavior 41: 633–56.

22.

Goitein

Elizabeth

Nunn

Joseph

. 2025. How Turning the Border Into a Military Zone Evades Congress and Threatens Rights. Brennan Center for Justice. https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/how-turning-border-military-zone-evades-congress-and-threatens-rights

23.

Hickel

R. Flavio

Jr Alamillo

Rudy

Oskooii

Kassra A. R.

Collingwood

Loren

. 2020. “The Role of Identity Prioritization: Why Some Latinx Support Restrictionist Immigration Policies and Candidates.” Public Opinion Quarterly 84 (4): 860–91.

24.

Homola

Jonathan

. 2021. “Partisanship and Perceived Threats About Immigration.” Party Politics 27 (5): 977–82.

25.

Huddy

Leonie

. 2001. “From Social to Political Identity: a Critical Examination of Social Identity Theory.” Political Psychology 22: 127–56.

26.

Huddy

Leonie

Khatib

Nadia

. 2007. “American Patriotism, National Identity, and Political Involvement.” American Journal of Political Science 51 (1): 63–77.

27.

Huddy

Leonie

Mason

Lilliana

Horwitz

S. Nechama

. 2016. “Political Identity Convergence: on Being Latino, Becoming a Democrat, and Getting Active.” RSF: The Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social Sciences 2 (3): 205–28.

28.

Huo

Yuen J.

Dovidio

John F.

Jiménez

Tomás R.

Schildkraut

Deborah J.

. 2018. “Not Just a National Issue: Effect of State-Level Reception of Immigrants and Population Changes on Intergroup Attitudes of Whites, Latinos, and Asians in the United States.” Journal of Social Issues 74 (4): 716–36.

29.

Jones-Correa

Michael

Espino

Rodolfo

Leal

D. L.

Meier

K. J.

. 2007. “Fuzzy Distinctions and Blurred Boundaries: Transnational, Ethnic, and Immigrant Politics.” In Latino Politics: Identity, Mobilization, and Representation, 44–60. University of Virginia Press.

30.

Just

Aida

Anderson

Christopher J.

. 2014. “Opinion Climates and Immigrant Political Action: a Cross-National Study of 25 European Democracies.” Comparative Political Studies 47 (7): 935–65.

31.

Kehrberg

Jason E.

Cepek

Emma A.

Trudo

Sydni L.

Yonts

Keygan T.

. 2025. “Education, Acculturation, and Latine Attitudes on Immigration.” Latino Studies 23 (1): 92–104.

32.

Kelly

Nathan J.

Kelly

Jana Morgan

. 2005. “Religion and Latino Partisanship in the United States.” Political Research Quarterly 58 (1): 87–95.

33.

Knoll

Benjamin R.

2012. “¿Compañero O Extranjero? Anti-Immigrant Nativism Among Latino Americans.” Social Science Quarterly 93 (4): 911–31.

34.

Krogstad

Jens Manuel

Stepler

Renee

Hugo Lopez

Mark

. 2015. English Proficiency on the Rise Among Latinos. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2015/05/12/english-proficiency-on-the-rise-among-latinos/

35.

Marsh

Wayde Z. C.

Ramírez

Ricardo

. 2019. “Unlinking Fate? Discrimination, Group-Consciousness, and Political Participation Among Latinos and Whites.” Politics, Groups, and Identities 7 (3): 625–41.

36.

Masuoka

Natalie

. 2008. “Defining the Group: Latino Identity and Political Participation.” American Politics Research 36 (1): 33–61.

37.

Miller

Lawrence

Polinard

Jerry

Wrinkle

Robert

. 1984. “Attitudes Toward Undocumented Workers: the Mexican American Perspective.” Social Science Quarterly 65: 482–94.

38.

Mora

Lauren

. 2022. Hispanic Enrollment Reaches New High at Four-Year Colleges in the U.S., But Affordability Remains an Obstacle. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2022/10/07/hispanic-enrollment-reaches-new-high-at-four-year-colleges-in-the-u-s-but-affordability-remains-an-obstacle/

39.

Moslimani

Mohamad

Noe-Bustamante

Luis

. 2023. Facts on Latinos in the U.S Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/race-and-ethnicity/fact-sheet/latinos-in-the-us-fact-sheet/

40.

Moslimani

Mohamad

Passel

Jeffrey S.

. 2024. What the Data Says About Immigrants in the U.S. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2024/09/27/key-findings-about-us-immigrants/

41.

Neville

Helen A.

Awad

Germine H.

Brooks

James E.

Flores

Michelle P.

Bluemel

Jamie

. 2013. “Color-Blind Racial Ideology: Theory, Training, and Measurement Implications in Psychology.” American Psychologist 68 (6): 455–66.

42.

Ollerenshaw

Trent

Jardina

Ashley

. 2023. “The Asymmetric Polarization of Immigration Opinion in the United States.” Public Opinion Quarterly 87 (4): 1038–53.

43.

O’Herron

Margy

. 2025. Big Budget Act Creates a ‘Deportation-Industrial Complex’. Brennan Center for Justice. https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/big-budget-act-creates-deportation-industrial-complex

44.

Pérez

Efrén

Cobain

Jessica

. 2024. “Latino Opinion and Action in the Struggle for America’s Political Future.” Annual Review of Political Science 27: 87–106.

45.

Dan

Garand

James C.

. 2024. “Perceptions of Threat, American National Identity, and Americans’ Attitudes Toward Documented and Undocumented Immigrants.” Political Research Quarterly 77 (3): 931–49.

46.

Roccas

Sonia

Brewer

Marilynn

. 2002. “Social Identity Complexity.” Personality and Social Psychology Review 6 (2): 88–106.

47.

Ross

Ashley D.

Rouse

Stella M.

. 2020. “(Young) Generations as Social Identities: the Role of Latino*Millennial/Generation Z in Shaping Attitudes About Climate Change.” Political Behavior 44: 1105–24.

48.

Rouse

Stella M.

Telhami

Shibley

. 2022. Poll Reveals White Americans See an Increase in Discrimination Against Other White People and Less Against Other Racial Groups. The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/poll-reveals-white-americans-see-an-increase-in-discrimination-against-other-white-people-and-less-against-other-racial-groups-185278

49.

Rouse

Stella M.

Wilkinson

Betina Cutaia

Garand

James

. 2010. “Divided Loyalties? Understanding Variation in Latino Attitudes Toward Immigration.” Social Science Quarterly 91 (3): 2010–882.

50.

Sanchez

Gabriel R.

2006. “The Role of Group Consciousness in Latino Public Opinion.” Political Research Quarterly 59 (3): 435–46.

51.

Sanchez

Gabriel R.

Masuoka

Natalie

. 2010. “Brown-Utility Heuristic? The Presence and Contributing Factors of Latino Linked Fate.” Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences 32 (4): 519–31.

52.

Scheve

Kenneth F.

Slaughter

Matthew J.

. 2001. “Labor Market Competition and Individual Preferences over Immigration Policy.” The Review of Economics and Statistics 83 (1): 133–45.

53.

Sears

David O.

Henry

Patrick J.

. 2003. “The Origins of Symbolic Racism.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 85 (2): 259–75.

54.

Silva

Daniella

Martinez

Didi

. 2025. ICE May Deport Some Migrants to ‘Third Countries’ Without Assurances They Won’t Be Tortured, Memo Says. NBC News. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/ice-deport-migrants-third-countries-assurances-wont-tortured-memo-rcna218990

55.

Stringer

Amy

. 2018. “Crossing the Border: Latino Attitudes Toward Immigration Policy.” International Migration & Integration 19: 701–15.

56.

Tajfel

Henri

. 1981. Human Groups and Social Categories: Studies in Social Psychology. Cambridge University Press.

57.

Tajfel

Henri

Turner

John C.

. 1979. “An Intergrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict.” In Intergroup Relations: Essential Readings, edited by Hogg

Abrams

. Psyychology Press.

58.

Tausanovitch

Chris

Vavreck

Lynn

. 2020. “Democracy Fund + UCLA Nationscape.” October 10-17, 2019 (Version 20200814). https://www.voterstudygroup.org/publication/nationscape-data-set

59.

Tesler

Michael

. 2016. Post-Racial or Most-Racial? Race and Politics in the Obama Era. University of Chicago Press.

60.

Vicuña

Bianca V.

Cass

Hannah

Chua

Ying Xuan

Tsoi

Sze Yi Celine

Pérez

Efrén O.

. 2022. “Diversity Management from a Target’s Perspective: a Pre-Registered Experiment on Latinos, Multiculturalism, and Colorblindness.” Politics, Groups, and Identities 12 (2): 415–32.

61.

Wakefield

Derek

. 2025. “It’s the Economy: the Effect of Economic Policy Appeals on Latino Independents.” Political Behavior 47: 1–24.

62.

West

Emily A.

Iyengar

Shanto

. 2022. “Partisanship as a Social Identity: Implications for Polarization.” Political Behavior 44 (2): 807–38.

Supplementary Material

Please find the following supplemental material available below.

For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.

For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.

0.15 MB

0.16 MB