Research on lawmaking generally examines why lawmakers enact certain policy ideas. However, most ideas in the United States Congress never become law. Eventually, members stop introducing them altogether. This process, where policies are proposed, not acted on, and no longer advocated for is, by far, the most common legislative outcome. The literature pays it little attention. Yet, how ideas die is important in understanding why some measures stop being realistic alternatives, the importance of policy entrepreneurship, and how policy windows affect the supply of ideas. This paper analyzes why congressional ideas die. I argue and find that the proposals designed to be enacted, especially by legislators with more issue expertise and agenda-setting powers, are less likely to persist across terms. I also show that ideas disappear more often when their sponsors leave Congress, but do not find a similar pattern for when policy windows close and lawmaking conditions worsen.
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