What is the effect of subnational elections on autocratic regime survival? The existing literature suggests that holding subnational elections help foster autocratic regime stability. I argue that the benefit of subnational elections for regime survival is conditional on a lack of media freedom: As the level of media freedom increases, the positive influence of holding subnational elections on regime survival decreases. This is because subnational elections provide local politicians with opportunities to build good reputations, and when good reputations formed at the local level spread to other jurisdictions via relatively free media, citizens can use them as a focal point to coordinate against the regime. Using the quantitative analysis of Time-Series Cross-Sectional data, I find empirical support for my theory.
AcemogluD.JohnsonS.RobinsonJ. A.YaredP.. 2009. “Reevaluating the Modernization Hypothesis.” Journal of Monetary Economics56 (8): 1043‐1058.
2.
AlbertusM.2015. “The Role of Subnational Politicians in Distributive Politics.” Comparative Political Studies48 (13): 1667‐1710.
3.
AlbertusM.MenaldoV.. 2012. “Dictators as Founding Fathers? The Role of Constitutions Under Autocracy.” Economics & Politics24 (3): 279‐306.
4.
AslaksenS.2010. “Oil and Democracy: More than a Cross-Country Correlation?” Journal of Peace Research47 (4): 421‐431.
5.
BesleyT.PratA.. 2006. “Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and Government Accountability.” American Economic Review96 (3): 720‐736.
6.
BlaydesLisa. 2010. Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak’s Egypt. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
7.
BoixCarles. 2003. Democracy and Redistribution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
8.
BrownleeJason. 2007. Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
9.
BuckleyN.FryeT.GarifullinaG.ReuterO. J.. 2014. “The Political Economy of Russian Gubernatorial Election and Appointment.” Europe-Asia Studies66 (8): 1213‐1233.
10.
CheibubJosé AntonioGandhiJenniferVreelandJames Raymond. 2010. “Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited.” Public Choice143 (1–2): 67‐101.
DukalskisA.GerschewskiJ.. 2017. “What Autocracies Say (and What Citizens Hear): Proposing Four Mechanisms of Autocratic Legitimation.” Contemporary Politics23 (3): 251‐268.
13.
DukalskisA.PataneC.. 2019. “Justifying Power: When Autocracies Talk about Themselves and Their Opponents.” Contemporary Politics25 (4): 457‐478.
14.
EgorovGeorgyGurievSergeiSoninKonstantin. 2009. “Why Resource-Poor Dictators Allow Freer Media: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data.” American Political Science Review103 (04): 645‐668.
15.
EsenB.GumuscuS.. 2016. “Rising Competitive Authoritarianism in Turkey.” Third World Quarterly37 (9): 1581‐1606.
16.
GandhiJennifer. 2008. Political Institutions under Dictatorship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
17.
GandhiJ.Lust-OkarE.. 2009. “Elections Under Authoritarianism.” Annual Review of Political Science12 (1): 403‐422.
18.
GeddesBarbara. 2005. “Why Parties and Elections in Authoritarian Regimes?” In Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington DC, 1 September 1 2005, 456‐471.
19.
GeddesBarbaraWrightJosephFrantzErica. 2014. “Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set.” Perspectives on Politics12 (02): 313‐331.
20.
GeddesBarbaraWrightJosephFrantzErica. 2018. How Dictatorships Work: Power, Personalization, and Collapse. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
21.
GehlbachS.SoninK.. 2014. “Government Control of the Media.” Journal of Public Economics118 (October): 163‐171.
22.
GehlbachS.SoninK.SvolikM. W.. 2016. “Formal Models of Nondemocratic Politics.” Annual Review of Political Science19 (1): 565‐584.
23.
GrundholmA. T.2020. “Taking It Personal? Investigating Regime Personalization as an Autocratic Survival Strategy.” Democratization27 (5): 797‐815.
24.
GüvençDuyguLangloisJérémie. 2019. “When Media Capture Backfires: Local Elections and Digital Media in Turkey.” Center for International Media Assistance. July 22, 2019. https://bit.ly/3t9r4Py
25.
HainmuellerJ.MummoloJ.XuY.. 2019. “How Much Should We Trust Estimates from Multiplicative Interaction Models? Simple Tools to Improve Empirical Practice.” Political Analysis27 (2): 163‐192.
26.
HanklaC. R.Manning.C.2017. “How Local Elections Can Transform National Politics: Evidence from Mozambique.” Publius: The Journal of Federalism47 (1): 49‐76.
27.
IyengarS.PetersM. D.KinderD. R.. 1982. “Experimental Demonstrations of the “Not-So-Minimal” Consequences of Television News Programs.” The American Political Science Review76 (4): 848‐58.
28.
KimN. K.KroegerA. M.. 2018. “Regime and Leader Instability Under Two Forms of Military Rule.” Comparative Political Studies51 (1): 3‐37.
29.
KnutsenCarl HenrikNygårdHåvard MokleivToreWig. 2017. “Autocratic Elections: Stabilizing Tool or Force for Change?” World Politics69 (01): 98‐143.
30.
KuntzP.ThompsonM. R.. 2009. “More than Just the Final Straw: Stolen Elections as Revolutionary Triggers.” Comparative Politics41 (3): 253‐272.
31.
LevitskyStevenWayLucan. 2010. Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
32.
LittleA. T.2012. “Elections, Fraud, and Election Monitoring in the Shadow of Revolution.” Quarterly Journal of Political Science7 (3): 249‐283.
33.
LittleA. T.2016. “Communication Technology and Protest.” The Journal of Politics78 (1): 152‐166.
34.
LorentzenP.2014. “China’s Strategic Censorship.” American Journal of Political Science58 (2): 402‐414.
35.
LuF.MaX.. 2019. “Is Any Publicity Good Publicity? Media Coverage, Party Institutions, and Authoritarian Power-Sharing.” Political Communication36 (1): 64‐82.
36.
LucardiA.2019. “Strength in Expectation: Elections, Economic Performance, and Authoritarian Breakdown.” The Journal of Politics81 (2): 552‐570.
37.
MagaloniBeatriz. 2006. Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
38.
MaleskyE.SchulerP.. 2011. “The Single-Party Dictator’s Dilemma: Information in Elections without Opposition.” Legislative Studies Quarterly36 (4): 491‐530.
39.
ManionM.2014. “Authoritarian Parochialism: Local Congressional Representation in China.” The China Quarterly218 (June): 311‐338.
40.
ManionM.2017. ““Good Types” in Authoritarian Elections.” Comparative Political Studies50 (3): 362‐394.
41.
McCombsM. E.ShawD. L.. 1972. “The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media.” Public Opinion Quarterly36 (2): 176‐87.
42.
MillerM. K.2015. “Elections, Information, and Policy Responsiveness in Autocratic Regimes.” Comparative Political Studies48 (6): 691‐727.
MyersonR. B.2006. “Does Advertising Exposure Affect Turnout?” Quarterly Journal of Political Science1 (1): 3‐23.
45.
MyersonRoger B.2011. “Toward a Theory of Leadership and State Building.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences108 (Supplement 4): 21297‐21301.
46.
NelsonThomas E.ClawsonRosalee A.OxleyZoe M.. 1997. “Media Framing of a Civil Liberties Conflict and Its Effect on Tolerance.” American Political Science Review91 (03): 567‐83.
47.
OlkenB. A.PandeR.. 2012. “Corruption in Developing Countries.” Annual Review of Economics4 (1): 479‐509.
48.
OlsonMancur. 1993. “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development.” American Political Science Review87 (03): 567‐576.
49.
PepinskyThomas. 2014. “The Institutional Turn in Comparative Authoritarianism.” British Journal of Political Science44 (03): 631‐53.
50.
PetrovaM.2011. “Newspapers and Parties: How Advertising Revenues Created an Independent Press.” American Political Science Review105 (4): 790‐808.
51.
PriceMonroe E.2002. Media and Sovereignty: The Global Information Revolution and Its Challenge to State Power. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
52.
RaknerLisevan de WalleNicolas. 2009. “Opposition Weakness in Africa.” Journal of Democracy20 (3): 108‐121.
53.
ReuterO. J.2013. “Regional Patrons and Hegemonic Party Electoral Performance in Russia.” Post-Soviet Affairs29 (2): 101‐135.
54.
ReuterO. J.BuckleyN.ShubenkovaA.GarifullinaG.. 2016. “Local Elections in Authoritarian Regimes.” Comparative Political Studies49 (5): 662‐697.
55.
ReuterO. J.RobertsonG. B.. 2012. “Subnational Appointments in Authoritarian Regimes: Evidence from Russian Gubernatorial Appointments.” The Journal of Politics74 (4): 1023‐1037.
56.
RossM. L.2001. “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” World Politics53 (3): 325‐361.
RozenasA.2016. “Office Insecurity and Electoral Manipulation.” The Journal of Politics78 (1): 232‐248.
59.
SabatiniC.2003. “Decentralization and Political Parties.” Journal of Democracy14 (2): 138‐150.
60.
SchedlerA.2002. “The Menu of Manipulation.” Journal of Democracy13 (2): 36‐50.
61.
ShadmehrM.BernhardtD.. 2017. “When Can Citizen Communication Hinder Successful Revolution?” Quarterly Journal of Political Science12 (3): 301‐323.
62.
ShirkD. A.2000. “Vicente Fox and the Rise of the PAN.” Journal of Democracy11 (4): 25‐32.
63.
SimpserAlberto. 2013. Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections: Theory, Practice, and Implications. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
64.
SolisJ. A.WaggonerP. D.. 2021. “Measuring Media Freedom: An Item Response Theory Analysis of Existing Indicators.” British Journal of Political Science51 (4): 1685‐1704.
65.
SvolikMilan W.2012. The Politics of Authoritarian Rule. Cambridge: Cambridge University.
66.
TuckerJ. A.2007. “Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and Post-Communist Colored Revolutions.” Perspectives on Politics5 (03): 535.
67.
Whitten-WoodringJ.Van BelleD. A.. 2017. “The Correlates of Media Freedom: An Introduction of the Global Media Freedom Dataset.” Political Science Research and Methods5 (1): 179‐188.
68.
WigT.RødE. G.. 2016. “Cues to Coup Plotters.” Journal of Conflict Resolution60 (5): 787‐812.
69.
WintrobeRonald. 1998. The Political Economy of Dictatorship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
70.
XiangJiquan. 2000. Self-Government in Chinese Villages: An Evaluation.” Perspective1 (4): 134‐184.
71.
ZhangXiobaShenggenFanLinxiuZhangJikunHuang2004. “Local governance and public goods provision in rural China.” Journal of Public Economics88 (12): 2857–2871.
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
