Although many studies agree that electoral systems shape campaign strategies that candidates employ, there is important variation in their focuses and rhetoric even among those who face the same institutional constrains. To solve this puzzle, I argue that the dynastic status of candidates, defined as coming from a family with a history of involvement in politics, is an important individual-level predictor of campaign strategies. Dynastic candidates inherit personal support bases from their family members who have previously served in congress, and the special ties with these support bases provide them strategic incentives to adopt particularistic appeals in their campaigns. Analyzing the electoral manifestos of legislative candidates in Japan, I show that dynastic candidates are more likely to emphasize the distribution of particularistic goods than nondynastic candidates. I also find that the link between dynastic status and a particularistic campaign is especially strong among candidates with relatively short political careers. This study contributes to literature on the determinants of campaign strategies by offering a micro-level explanation for why some candidates rely more heavily on targeted and particularistic appeals than others.
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