Abstract
We present a parsimonious framework for understanding contextual variation in legislative nonresponse. We argue that legislators’ propensity to vote is a function of their willingness and ability to be physically present in the chamber and determine the best position to take on a given proposal. From this framework, we derive four hypotheses regarding the compensation legislators receive, their opportunity to pursue work outside of the chamber, and their informational resources. Analyzing data on over seven million voting opportunities across two sessions in ninety-nine chambers, we find robust evidence that longer legislative sessions decrease nonresponse and that informational resources increase nonresponse, but no evidence that compensation influences nonresponse.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
