Organized Interests in Constitutional Assemblies

Abstract

How does the way organized interests are included in constitution-drafting processes effect their capacity? Two recent examples of post-revolutionary constitution drafting in Egypt and Tunisia provide evidence that the way trade unions are included in constitutional assemblies matters a great deal. These cases suggest that not just whether organized interests are included in the constitution-drafting process but how impacts their long-term influence. Prior to the revolutions, both countries used corporatist labor practices including hierarchical, exclusionary labor confederations with close ties to the regime. Despite similar origins, labor-state relationships evolved differently. Tunisia’s Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT) enjoyed an “external” role and little formal challenge as interest aggregator for trade unionists; Egypt’s Trade Union Federation (ETUF) faced challenges from independent trade unionists and little influence in government. These differences can be seen through an understudied realm of contestation: the constitutional assemblies. These outcomes are in part a result of the different ways these assemblies were crafted, and the way trade unionists interacted with politicians as a result. This article is based on original fieldwork in Egypt and Tunisia with politicians, trade unionists, and activists conducted between 2011 and 2014.