Abstract
This paper uses Brazilian subnational panel data for 1997–2005 to examine how electoral and partisan pressures affect the ways in which state governors respond to protests over agrarian reform. The results are broadly consistent with the theoretical prediction that governors with precarious political positions are less likely to promote repressive policing strategies. A governor’s party’s share of seats in the state legislature is a significant positive predictor of both harsh and mild forms of repression. The percentage of votes attained in the first round of the previous election is an additional significant positive predictor of mild repression only.
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