Condorcet’s theory of voting rests on the crucial proposition that voting errors are random and not systematic. Using Lau and Redlawsk’s voting correctly measure, I test whether voting error is systematic or random in presidential elections from 1972 to 2004. I show that errors are systematically skewed toward Republican candidates. I also show that the level of skew of incorrect voting has led to the incorrect candidate being elected in three out the last nine elections. In addition, I find that greater skew in Republican campaign spending increases skew of incorrect votes toward Republican candidates.
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