Even though political parties maintain control of presidential nominations, little is known about what leads individual party members to participate in the process. Party elites have a collective incentive to nominate an electorally viable and ideologically unifying candidate, and they also have personal, strategic incentives that may foster or prevent their participation in the nominating process. Using endorsement data on a subset of party elites—members of the U.S. House of Representatives—this article finds that individual members of the extended party are strategic with their decision to participate in or abstain from the nomination process.
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