This study examines how ten interest groups used electronic mail to mobilize their supporters in response to the Supreme Court nominations of John G. Roberts, Jr., Harriet Miers, and Samuel A. Alito, Jr. The effects of group characteristics and goals, the dynamics of the confirmation process, and prior behavior are evaluated. Logit results reveal that group traits and preferences influence the likelihood of requests for action and donations. Funding requests were also conditioned by the stage of the process. The findings show that interest groups use Supreme Court turnover as an opportunity for political advocacy and organizational maintenance.
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