Abstract
This study examines the institutional development of governors’ offices. Pooled analyses from 1983 to 2004 indicate that government growth and workload foster institutionalization, as does rivalry with the legislature. Bargaining relationships with external actors appear to have more limited impact. The authors also find that the dispersion of authority within the executive branch plays a significant role in explaining the development of institutionalized staff structures. Overall, the results indicate that separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches affects gubernatorial institutionalization but that researchers should also consider the intercurrencies that exist within the executive branch.
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