Contribution Limits and Disparity in Contributions between Gubernatorial Candidates

Abstract

Campaign contribution limits have been a common feature of campaign finance reform efforts in most states. Despite their apparent popularity, campaign contribution limits have been criticized in academic literature. In particular, it has been suggested that contribution limits are likely to increase the disparity in contributions among candidates in general and the disparity between incumbents and challengers in particular. In this article we subject this important criticism of campaign contribution limits to empirical testing. Analyses of both the number of contributors and the dollar amount of contributions to gubernatorial candidates suggest no sup-port for an increased bias in favor of incumbents resulting from the presence of contribution limits. If any-thing, contribution limits can work to reduce the bias that traditionally works in favor of incumbents. Also, contribution limits do not seem to increase contribution disparity between candidates in general. Results hold for different subsets of contributors: all contributors, particularistic contributors, and corporate contributors.