A prominent literature on voting behavior during democratic transition in Mexico focuses upon two considerations: voters’ attitudes toward the dominant party and their uncertainty about the consequences of opposition government. These two considerations are said to form the first step of a “two-step” process that voters use to determine which party to support. In this article, I examine the evidence for this argument, using data from both Mexico and Taiwan and conclude that voters in nations with hegemonic parties give greater weight to the public policies of the dominant party than the two-step model argues. These findings have important implications for the opposition’s behavior in trying to complete a transition from a one-party dominant government to a multi-party democracy.
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