This study revisits the question of whether committees are biased in their policy outputs—pursuing policies at odds with noncommittee members. We find evidence that committees in the House are biased: Most committees are either more divided than the larger membership in the House, or there is a greater consensus within the committee than among noncommittee members. These patterns extend across all types of committees.
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