Most research on the lobbying strategies of organized interests is venue specific. Yet organized interests frequently lobby in many different kinds of institutional venues, often on a single issue. I develop and test a model of the decision to lobby in one venue over another on a specific issue. Included in the model is the impact of oppositions from opposing interests in a particular venue, a factor that has not been considered in past research. I test the model with data from interviews with lobbyists for groups that were active on the issue of financial modernization between 1997 and 1999. I find significant variation in the amount of lobbying performed by different organizations on this issue in different venues; expectations of opposition from other interests are a significant factor in the decision to lobby in a given venue.
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