In this article I combine two existing policy theories, institutional rational choice and the Advocacy Coalition Framework, to explain actor perceptions of the effectiveness of public policies targeting common-pool resource dilemmas in coastal watersheds. Survey data from estuaries with and without the USEPA’s National Estuary Program provides evidence for two main hypotheses. First, perceived policy effectiveness is a function of “collective-action beliefs”: beliefs about situational variables that determine the benefits and transaction costs of collective action within the estuary action arena. Second, the effects of policy-core beliefs and institutional structure on perceived policy effectiveness are interdependent. In particular, governance institutions have a favorable effect on perceived policy effectiveness among political actors whose policy-core beliefs are congruent with the structure of the institution.
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