Examiining Claims about Procedural Choice: The Use of Floor Waivers in the U.S. House

Abstract

Congressional theories offer competing explanations of the role of restrictive amendment rules in the U.S. House (Krehbiel 1997; Dion and Huber 1996; Sinclair 1999). But this literature has largely ignored the importance of waivers in the legislative process. Our analysis begins to address this gap by utilizing waivers to test theoretical claims that to this point have only been applied to the amendment portion of special rules. We find waivers are a source of conflict on special rules independent of the restrictive characteristics of the rule. We also find waiver protections can be explained by some of the same determinants of restrictive rules as claimed by informational, distributive, and partisan theories, but that no single explanation covers all types of waivers. In general, we infer from these results that procedural choice is shaped not only by amendment restrictions imposed by special rules, but also by features of waivers that determine which standing rules of the House may apply. By not incorporating waivers in our studies of floor procedure, we miss an important source of evidence for distinguishing between theories of legislative organization.