How Long Do Economic Sanctions Last? Examining the Sanctioning Process through Duration

Abstract

In this research we consider the determinants of economic sanction duration. Why do some sanction episodes last longer than others do? Why do some target states concede faster than others do? To explain the duration of sanction episodes we consider the target's institutional struture and its political stability We develop a theoretical framework based on the target's political features and apply this model to 108 sanction cases using hazard analysis. Our empirical findings indicate that the target state's features, especially its institutional structure and the politcal vulnerability of its regime, significantly impact the duration of sanction episodes.

Get full access to this article

View all access options for this article.

References

Allison, P. D. 1984. Event History Analysis. New Bury Park, NY: Sage.

Beck, N. 1998. “Modeling Space and Time: The Event History Approach”. In Elinor Scarbrough and Eric Tanenbaum , eds., Research Strategies in Social Scence, pp. 191-213. New York: Oxford University Press.

Bennett, D S. 1997. “Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration, 1816-1984”. American Journal of Politics 41: 846-878.

Bennett, D. S. , and A. Stam . 1996. “The Duration of Interstate War, 1816-1985”. American Political Science Review 90: 239-257.

Box-Steffensmeier, J. , and B. Jones . 1997. “Time is of the Essence: Event History Models in Political Science”. AmericanJournal of Political Science 41: 1414-1461.

Bueno de Mesquita, B. , and R. Siverson . 1995. “War and the Survival of Political Leaders”. American Political Science Review 89: 841-855.

Bueno de Mesquita, B. , and R. Siverson . 1997. “Nasty or Nice? Political Systems, Endogenous Norms and the Treatment of Adversaries”. Journal of Conflict Resolution 42: 175-199.

Bueno de Mesquita, B. , J. Morrow , R. Siverson , and A. Smith . 1999. “Policy and Failure and Political Survival”. Journal of Conflict Resolution 43: 147-161.

Carswell, R. 1981-1982. “Economic Sanctions”. Foreign Affairs 60: 247-265

10.

Coser, L.A. 1956. The Function of Social Conflict. New York: Free Press.

11.

Dashti-Gibson, J. , P. Davis , and B. Radcliff . 1997. “On the Determinants of Ecnomic Sanctions: An Empirical Analysis”. AmericanJournal of Political Science 41: 608-618.

12.

Daoudi, M. , and M. Dajani . 1983. Economic Sanctions: Ideals and Experience. London, UK: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

13.

Deese, D. 1983. “The Vulnerability of Modern Nations: Economic Diplomacy in East-West Relations”. In M. Nincic and P Wallensteen , eds., Dilemmas of Ecnomic Coercion. New York: Praeger.

14.

Doxey, M. 1971. Economic Sanctions & International Enforcement. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

15.

Doxey, M. 1987. International Sanctions in a Contemporary Perspective. London, UK: Macmillan Press.

16.

Drezner, D. W. 1998. “Conflict Expectations and the Paradox of Economic Coecion”. International Studies Quarterly 42: 709-732.

17.

Elliott, K. A. 1998. “The Sanctions Glass: Half Full or Completely Empty” Intenational Security 23: 50-65.

18.

Fearon, James D. 1993. “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes”. American Political Science Review 88: 577-592

19.

Galtung, J. 1967. “On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions, with Examples for the Case of Rhodesia”. World Politics 19: 378-416.

20.

Gasiorowski, M. 1995 “Economic Crisis and Political Regime Change: An Event History Analysis”. American Political Science Review 89: 882-898.

21.

Gourevitch, P. 1986.Politics in Hard Times. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

22.

Green, J. 1983. “Strategies for Evading Economic Sanctions”. In M. Nincic and P. Wallensteen , eds., Dilemmas of Economic Coercion. New York: Praeger.

23.

Greene, W. 1993. Econometric Analysis. New York: McMillan

24.

Greene, W. 1995. LIMDEP Version 7.0. Plainview, NY: Econometric Software Inc..

25.

Gurr, T. , K. Jaggers , and W Moore . 1991. “The Transformation of the Western State: The Growth of Democracy, Autocracy and State Power Since 1800”. In Alex Inkeles , ed., On Measuring Democracy. New Brunswick, CAN: Transaction.

26.

Hall, P. 1986. Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Brtain and France. New York: Oxford University Press.

27.

Hufbauer,G. , J. Schott , and K. Elliott . 1990a. Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. Washington DC: Institute for International Economics.

28.

Hufbauer,G. , J. Schott , and K. Elliott . 1990b. Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: Supplemental Case History. Wasington, DC: Institute for International Economics.

29.

Jaggers, K. , and T. Gurr . 1995. “Tracking Democracy's Third Wave with the Polity III Data”. Journal of Peace Research 32: 469-482.

30.

Jones, D. , J.D. Singer , and S. Bremer . 1996. “Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1992: Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns”. Conflict Maagement and Peace Science 16: 163-213.

31.

Kaempfer, W. , and A. Lowenberg . 1992. International Economic Sanctions: A Public Choice Perspective. San Francisco: Westview Press.

32.

Kaempfer, W. , and A. Lowenberg . 1999. “Unilateral Versus Multilateral International Sanctions: A Public Choice Perspective”. International Studies Quarterly 43: 37-58.

33.

Kiefer, Nicholas M. 1988. “Economic Duration Data and Hazard Functions”. Journal of Economic Literature 26: 646-679.

34.

Knorr, K. 1975. The Power of Nations. New York: Basic Books.

35.

Laingen, B. 1992. Yellow Ribbon. Washington, DC: Brassey's.

36.

Lindsay, J. 1986. “Trade Sanctions as Policy Instruments: A Re-examination”. International Studies Quarterly 30: 153-173.

37.

Martin, L. 1992. Coercive Cooperation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

38.

McLaughlin, S. , S. Gates , H. Hegre , R. Gissenger , and N. P Gelditsch . 1998. “Timing Changes in Political Structures: A New Policy Database”. Journal of Conflict Resolution 42: 231-242.

39.

Milani, M. 1988. The Making of Iran's Islamic Revolution. Boulder, CO: Westview

40.

Milner, H. 1997. Interests, Institutions and Information. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

41.

Miyagawa, M. 1993. “Do Economic Sanctions Work?” International Affairs 69: 576-577.

42.

Morgan, C. 1995. “Clinton's Chinese Puzzle: Domestic Politics and the Effectivness of Economic Sanctions”. Issues and Studies 31: 19-46.

43.

Morgan, C. , and S. Campbell . 1991. “Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints, and War”. Journal of Conflict Resolution 35: 187-197.

44.

Morgan, C. , and A. Miers . 1999. “When Threats Succeed: A Formal Model of the Threat and Use of Economic Sanctions”. Paper presented at the Annual Meeing of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, GA, September 2-5.

45.

Morgan, C. , and V Schwebach . 1992. “Take Two Democracies and Call Me in the Morning”. International Interactions 17: 305-320.

46.

Morgan, C. , and V Schwebach . 1995. “Economic Sanctions as Instruments of Foreign Policy: The Role of Domestic Politics”. International Interactions 21: 247-264

47.

Morgan, C. , and V Schwebach . 1997. “Fools Suffer Gladly: The Use of Economic Sanctions in Intenational Crises”. International Studies Quarterly 41: 27-50.

48.

Nincic, M. , and P Wallensteen . 1983. Dilemmas of Economic Coercion. New York: Praeger.

49.

Nossal, K. 1989. “Intemational Sanctions as International Punishment”. Intenational Organization 43: 301-322.

50.

Nossal, K. 1998. “Liberal-democratic Regime's and the Effectiveness of Interntional Sanctions: Does Regime Type Make a Difference?” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of Canadian Political Science Association, University of Ottawa. CAN, June 2.

51.

Pape, R. 1997. “Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work?” International Security 22: 90-136.

52.

Pape, R. 1998. “Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work” International Secrty 23: 66-77.

53.

Partell P. 1997. “Executive Constraints and Success in International Crises”. political Research Quarterly 50: 503-528.

54.

Putnam. R. 1988. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of the Two-Level Games”. International Organization 42: 427-460.

55.

Renwick, R. 1981. Economic Sanctions. Cambridge, MA: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.

56.

Simel, G. 1956. Conflict, trans. K. H. Woldff. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.

57.

smith, A. 1996. “The Success and Use of Economic Sanctions”. International Interactions 21: 229-245.

58.

Sylvan, D. 1983. “Ideology and the Concept of Economic Security” In M. Nincic and P Wallensteen , eds., Dilemmas of Economic Coercion. New York: Praeger.

59.

Timmerman, K. 1996. “Support Democracy and Change in Iran”. Middle East Data Project.

60.

Thelen, K. S. , and K. Steinmo . 1992. “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics”. In K. S. Thelen , S. Steinmo , and E Longstreth , eds., Structuning Poitics. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

61.

Wagner, R. 1988. “Economic Interdependence, Bargaining Power, and Political Influence”. International Organization 42: 461-442.

62.

Wallensteen, P. 1968. “Characteristics of Economic Sanctions”. Journal of Peace Research 5: 248-227.

63.

Wolfers, Arnold . 1963. Discord and Collaboration. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.