Using extensive interview and committee testimony data across two contrasting sets of interests (environmental and labor), this article exaines the effects of changing House institutional structure on legislative lobbying. Specifically, I argue that the institutional context of the posreform House has altered the role of lobbyists as information providers by expanding the scope of the conflict to different committees, forcing groups to lobby a wider variety of legislative actors. Relying upon a ditinction between ‘technical’ and ‘political’ information, I contend that the effect of decentralizing reforms is strengthened or attenuated by the informational focus of the interest group. Using longitudinal committee testimony data (1959-92) for ten groups, I show that the mid-1970s House reforms had differential effects on environmental groups and labor unions-in part, depending on group informational focus. The results have implications for studies of lobbying tactics, theories of information provision, and models of legislative institutional structure.
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