Challenges to Hegemonic Constructions of Militarized Masculinities in the Neoliberal Era: The Case of South Korea

Abstract

In South Korea, military conscription lies at the core of the construction of notions of manhood and gender order as a whole. In a divided country, the hegemonic meaning of military service as a crucial marker of adult manhood remained unquestioned. However, since the implementation of full-blown neoliberalism, there has been a shift in societal gender norms and this in turn has changed the way in which militarized masculinities are constructed and enacted at the individual level. Drawn from qualitative interviews with South Korean former conscripts, this article examines the tension between militarized and neoliberal masculine ideals and how hegemonic constructions of militarized masculinities are challenged in it.

The concept of militarized masculinity has evolved as a significant conceptual tool and a site for empirical research in both feminist international relations and in critical men and masculinities studies. It has helped scholars to explain not only gendered identities within a range of militarized contexts (Henry, 2017) but also how military standards function in the production of wider normative, hegemonic manliness (Chisholm & Tidy, 2017). However, much of the work has tended to focus on the connection between militaries, masculinities and violence, often looking to certain groups such as soldiers, military peacekeepers, combatants and ex-combatants (Baaz & Stern, 2008; Friðriksdóttir, 2021). This focus is on the one hand understandable since military training and socialization aim primarily at the preparation for war fighting (Koeszegi et al., 2014) and militarized men are by and large the main perpetrators of violences committed in conflict-affected situations (Simic, 2009; Whitworth, 2004). On the other hand, the focus is problematic in two respects: the oversimplification of accounts of hegemonic and militarized masculinities without relating them to their historical, political, and socioeconomic contexts (Bulmer & Eichler, 2017; Myrttinen et al., 2017); and the denial of possibilities for change in hegemonic masculinities (Duncanson 2015; Duncanson & Woodward, 2016) – an issue which I focus on in this article.

Building on the literature that points to the complexities, contradictions, and fragility of militarized masculinities, this article addresses the question of how hegemonic constructions of militarized masculinities are contested through a look at the case of South Korea. South Korea (hereafter Korea) is an intriguing case with which to examine the research question for two main reasons. First, as Korea has implemented universal conscription system since 1949, military service has played a central role in the construction of notions of manhood and gender order as a whole (Kwon, 2001). In the context of the continuing war with North Korea, a popular expectation that “a man has to serve in the military to play a man’s role” remained unquestioned (Moon, 2005a, p. 53), and thus, the completion of military service was seen as a crucial marker of adult manhood for decades (Moon, 2002). Second, contemporary Korea has gone through shifts in societal gender norms in response to dramatic socioeconomic and cultural changes and this, in turn, has led to the emergence of new hegemonic masculine ideals (e.g., Ainslie, 2017; Holliday & Elfving-Hwang, 2012). Despite this, little has been studied about how these changes influence the construction of militarized masculinities at the individual level. In much of the feminist scholarly work on Korean masculinities, the focus has privileged men’s military experience at the expense of the broader social context or conscripts’ civilian identities (Bulmer & Eichler, 2017). As a result, Korean militarized masculinity has tended to be seen as a thing that is static, aggressive, and inherently problematic. To fill this gap, drawn from qualitative interviews with Korean former conscripts, the present study examines how hegemonic militarized masculinities are challenged in the neoliberal era.

I begin this article by discussing the theories of militarized masculinities, with a particular focus on challenges and changes to the common understandings of militarized masculinities. After providing a brief background of the Korean context I then introduce my methodology. Next, I present research findings, with each section shedding light on the complexity and fluidity of the constructions of Korean militarized masculinities in the neoliberal era, and thus, the possibility of changes in them.

Theories of Militarized Masculinities

Militaries have been important sites for feminist investigations into hegemonic masculinities since male bodies dominate in them, and have done so historically, and a particular form of masculinity has become the norm (Kronsell, 2006). The hegemonic masculinity associated with the military, although differing depending on history and socio-cultural context, is traditionally associated with attributes like physical strength, aggression, heterosexuality, emotional control and risk-taking (Cogan et al., 2019; Wegner, 2021; Wilén, 2020). Although this model does not necessarily reflect the most common form of masculinity in military institutions, it requires all men to negotiate their masculinity in relation to it (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005; Duncanson, 2015). There have existed a high level of aggression and a strong differentiation and denigration of every servicemember who does not comply with hegemonic masculine standards (Barrett, 1996; Hinojosa, 2010).

While hegemonic ideas of militarized masculinities are important, recent work on militaries, masculinities and war challenges some of the fundamental understandings of previous scholarship and calls for a more nuanced investigation of the concept. In their study, Bazz and Stern (2008) show how the narratives of soldiers who engaged in the violent acts in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) challenged the dominant representation of African soldiers and combatants. For interviewed soldiers, the celebrated successful soldier was not the strong, tough, merciless fighter, but a soldier who follows orders and even does administrative work. This is because the notion of manhood in the DRC was closely linked to material wealth and education, rather than to an idealized celebration of the man-fighter. In a similar vein, Friðriksdóttir (2021) demonstrates that militarized masculinity was not hegemonic nor was militarized masculinity linked to aggression and violence in Burundi. As being the family provider and having economic capital were of central importance for masculinity construction, soldiering was seen as an obstacle to reaching manhood for in Burundi.

Some scholars focus on the potential to transform hegemonic militarized masculinities. Connell & Messerschmidt (2005) contend that “the conceptualization of hegemonic masculinity should explicitly acknowledge the possibility of democratizing gender relations, of abolishing power differentials, not just of reproducing hierarchy” (p. 853). As an attempt to support this argument, Duncanson (2009, 2013) suggests the concept of peacekeeper masculinity as an alternative militarized masculinity to the combat model; a masculinity that is constructed through relations of empathy, respect, and equality, not through domination and dehumanization, in the peacekeeping context. While not denying the risk that peacekeeper masculinity may create new hierarchies, Duncanson (2015) claims that it can lead to more fundamental changes which would actually dismantle hegemony.

Recent contributions to the study of change in hegemonic masculinities have paid close attention to post-conflict situations because conflict tends to involve a shift in traditional gender roles which do not fit well with traditional gender norms and expectations (Myrttinen et al., 2017). Messerschmidt & Quest (2023) conceptualize masculinities in conflict-affected societies at three different levels: the societal, institutional, and individual. “Societal understandings and performance of masculinities in turn impose limits of acceptability and appropriateness on both institutional and individual practices” (p. 4). This framework allows to capture even small changes in masculine practices and the masculinities they perform at different analytical levels, though these changes are “not necessarily unidirectional, homogenous, or linear” (p. 7). For instance, attitudes towards gender (in)equality and sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) can be a useful indicator to analyze how post-conflict individual masculinities change. When a person questions both the violent act itself and the underlying patriarchal hierarchies and promotes more equal gender relations, rather than seeing SGBV as acceptable and legitimate, he engages in peace-conducive masculinity practices, which is the opposite case for violence-centered counterparts.

Some empirical examples from recent research provide evidence of these changes. In Riley’s (2019) study, the increased visibility of women in traditionally masculine roles as a result of conflict caused former members of the People’s Liberation Army of Nepal (PLA) to reconsider gendered assumptions and hierarchies. Male PLA members engaged with more gender-equal ideology and practices than existed in society. This does not mean that there was no continued gendered ideological thinking around the role of women. “Admiration for women’s roles in the PLA was persistently equated with attributes that tend to be associated with stereotypical hegemonic masculinities” (p. 557). However, it should not be overlooked that any changes in violence-centered militarized masculinities could be signs of progressive gendered change in post-conflict situation (Duncanson, 2015; Riley, 2019). Quest’s (2022) study shows how security sector reform (SSR) can change institutional constructions of masculinity in post-conflict militaries. During the conflict, the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) perpetrated large-scale violence against civilians, performing particularly violent forms of masculinity. “After the war, the AFL was dissolved and rebuilt with an emphasis on human rights and, partly, gender mainstreaming” via SSR (p. 463). This finding also indicates that “small-scale changes have materialized that might provide the basis for more encompassing change in the future” (p. 483).

Constructions of Militarized Masculinities in the Korean Context

Since the 1950s’ trauma of the Korean War, both state elites and ordinary Koreans have treated the need for a strong military, national defense, and the maintenance of conscription like a triad of unbreakable assumptions (Kwon, 2001). A popular expectation that a man has to serve in the military to play a man’s role remained unquestioned for decades under the military-backed authoritarian regimes. During this period, military service was also integrated into the overall working of the labor market. Recognizing military service as a work experience, both public and private firms developed conventional practices of granting higher pay and faster promotion to veterans. This was central to the remaking of the modern gender hierarchy based on the division of labor between housewife and husband-provider (Moon, 2005a).

The apparent hegemony of conscription among Koreans has, however, begun to unravel in the context of the political and economic changes within and outside Korea throughout 1990s (Moon, 2005b). Among various factors, neoliberalism, which places strong emphasis on individuality, competition, self-managing and responsibility (Abelmann et al., 2009), has had a profound role on this by challenging traditional gender norms. For example, men’s self-care focused on their own bodies and well-being have become a new masculine ideal (Frank, 2014; Weber, 2014). The softness that lay in men’s individual personalities is also seen as an important element of ideal manhood. Softer masculinity embodies a significant lack of traditional manly characteristics such as aggressiveness and sexual dominance (Louie, 2012). Instead, it stresses more sensitive and caring attitude towards women, who are treated as friends, not as sexual objects (Song, 2016).

The emergence of new masculine practices has changed the way in which young Korean males perceive their military service and engage in military practices. First of all, since the age of conscription overlaps with the peak of period for higher education, or early career development (Song, 2015), a perception that serving in the military is “wasting the prime time of one’s life” has become widespread (Moon, 2005b, p. 71). Particularly, due to the state’s vigorous pursuit of globalization and neoliberal policies, the number of young Koreans who travel, study and emigrate abroad has increased dramatically (Kwon & Roy, 2007). In this circumstance, young Korean males have to deal with the dilemma between their quest for becoming global and their obligation to complete military service (Song, 2015). However, military service has not always been considered to be worthless. Men as neoliberal subjects have tended to interpret the time of their military service as a generative period in which to plan for “real life” (p. 68) by acquiring some necessary skills for organizational life in their future workplace (Moon, 2002).

However, this change in popular perceptions of military service has not fundamentally challenged the tight linkage between military service and hegemonic masculinity in Korea. Despite the growing distaste for military service, it is still considered as a necessary means for achieving normal manhood (Moon, 2005b). Recent study on the transnational lives of young Korean men (Song, 2015) shows that military conscription not only structures their normal life but also continues to remain an important, culturally recognized badge of masculinity. Her study also reveals that many Koreans often regard men qualified for conscription as competent human capital possessing normal personhood. In this study, one participant, who got exempted from military service unexpectedly due to a newly developed kidney problem, was very concerned about having stigma attached to being a disqualified man for military service, and his own perception of himself as a healthy, athletic man was challenged. Lee et al., (2019) demonstrates that militarized masculinities of young Korean men are transferred to their organizational positions and serve as a crucial standard to evaluate others. Participants in this study tended to think less of those who did not fulfil their miliary service on active duty, believing that these men would have psychological or physical problems. Non-veterans including women were seen to be less willing to make sacrifices for the organization than veterans. Those who completed service in an alternative form were also seen as less competent and cooperative. All these studies show that even for neoliberal subjects, military service still remains crucial in performing hegemonic masculinities in Korean society.

Methodology

I adopted an interpretive grounded theory approach, which is well suited for research into complex dynamics of social processes, such as identity constructions (Lee et al., 2019). Grounded theory is commonly “used to generate theory where little is already known, or to provide a fresh slant on existing knowledge” (Goulding, 2002, p. 42). Given this, grounded theory approach seemed to fit well my research purpose since very few studies have featured the Korean individual soldiers’ perceptive thought processes, retrospection, or narratives.

The primary data were collected through semi-structured interviews with ten Korean men, who have come to adulthood and completed military service on active duty in the neoliberal age. Participants were recruited from two sources: advertisement posted on a website of Handong Global University Alumni Association; and snowball method. Seven interviews were conducted face-to-face at a coffee shop of the participants’ choosing in Seoul with only me and the participant present, and three interviews online, between July and August in 2020. All interviews were carried out in Korean and electronically recorded for subsequent transcription and analysis. Identification numbers (e.g., KX for those who served in the Korean military) were assigned to participants instead of their names to assure anonymity. Although the list of issues changed constantly to accommodate both emerging themes and my increasing understanding in each interview, I included similar questions on some issues to evaluate and better compare the themes (Endres & Weibler, 2020). Those are: (1) definition of ideal men; (2) perceptions of military norms and culture; (3) assigned military roles; (4) gains and losses through military service; (5) perceptions of female soldiers; and (6) qualities for being a good soldier.

All participants, whose age ranged from 27 to 39 years old, held at least a bachelor’s degree and worked as full-time professionals at the time of interview. I chose these criteria, i.e., age, education level, employment status, because men with these credentials follow a similar life trajectory of attending college, completing military service, returning to college and entering the workforce in neoliberal Korean society (Lee et al., 2019). However, it does not guarantee that these characteristics are shared by a large majority of Korean men. Under neoliberalism, social exclusion in labor market based on social class, or socio-cultural deprivation arising from an increase in private education costs have taken place (Lim & Jang, 2006). Given this, participants in this study are privileged group of Korean society, representing middle-to-upper class.

I analyzed the data by using three main types of grounded theory coding procedures: open; axial; and selective. Initial open coding was completed using line-by-line techniques, which enabled me to gain a close look at what participants meant and to identify implicit concerns as well as explicit statements (Charmaz, 2006). Through this process, I generated 25 first-order concepts that captured the participants’ experiences and interpretations of their military practices and masculinities. Through axial coding, I reassembled the first-order concepts into groupings based on relationships and pattern within and among the codes identified during open coding. This process generated ten emerging categories. At the final stage, I used selective coding for the full integration of axial codes and the development of more abstract theoretical framework. As a result, five theoretical themes were generated, which are: (1) prioritizing a good family provider role; (2) intense pressure under neoliberalism; (3) construction of militarized masculinities as a complex process; (4) ambivalence towards female soldiers; and (5) positive perceptions of softer militarized masculinities. These five themes will be explained in detail in the next section.

Lastly, how I engaged in a self-reflexive process should be noted because differences between researcher and participants in race, class, gender, age, and ideologies can affect the direction and content of interviews (Charmaz, 2006). I paid careful attention to how my position as a female researcher without military experience shaped the interaction between me and male participants. Participants appeared to have an assumption that I was unable to fully understand military life. For this reason, they were responsive but adopted assertive positions as if teaching the interviewer about “men’s world”. However, as Hale (2012) notes, gender difference between the researcher and the participants does not necessarily have a negative impact on the research because consideration of this difference is of itself importance in relation to issues of gender and identity construction. Nonetheless, considering that an interview situation was somewhat unusual for most participants, where men spoke about their military life to a woman researcher, who was in an authoritative position to lead an interview, I tried to remain attentive and open to participants’ stories without judgement, as an individual who knew relatively little about them. Therefore, participants were generally able to speak openly about their perceptions, feelings, and experiences.

Findings

Prioritizing a Good Family Provider Role

Nine out of ten participants viewed becoming a good family provider as the most important element of ideal men. They assumed heterosexuality as a normative category to establish a family and based their masculine identities on the role of successful family head. K1 clearly stated that “men should be able to support his family financially enough and let them enjoy an affluent life”. Moon (2002) claims that the role of family provider as a dominant masculine ideal is the material basis of men’s authority as fathers and husbands in modernized Korean society. Failure at this role could lead to a loss of respect and authority in the family, and subsequently, “a loss of masculinity” (p. 86).

While not denying that being able to provide was one of the normative masculine ideals, however, some participants expressed personal disagreement or internal conflicts between living up to the standards of the ideal man and living their own lives the way they would want. K10 stated that:

In Korean society, men are usually assessed by their earning power, which seems the most important in claiming masculine status. I have already heard many stories about alienated fathers from their family because they are laid off or fail to provide financial support. I hate this reality but in order to be a respectable father and a husband, men have no choice but to become a good family provider.

K4’s comment showed more clearly that his individual conceptualization of masculinity departed from societal gendered norms.

I am against the idea of what men should be like. For example, people think that men should earn money to support a family or that men should not complain about difficulties in the workplace at home. I have always come into conflict with this men’s stuff and felt so tired of it.

Some participants also distanced themselves from traditional masculine men, characterized by verbal domination, sexist or misogynist attitude and behavior. Instead, they valued attributes of “New Man”, who is “highly involved with his family, nurturing, and emotionally expressive” (Kim & Pyke, 2015, p. 510). They emphasized the importance of egalitarian family division of labor and expressed a desire to be more involved with their children than their fathers were with them. However, an assumption that it would be impossible to live outside the prevailing dominant patterns of masculinity was shared by all participants and thus, regardless of their intentions, they acknowledged that they should succeed to a certain extent in performing a traditional men’s role, a good family provider.

Intense Pressure under Neoliberalism

The theme of neoliberal manhood emerged from all participants. They mentioned constant self-development, competence at work, personal responsibility and authorship for their economic and general wellbeing. K7 working from home due to the Covid-19 pandemic at the time of interview was concerned about “getting too lazy to stay motivated”. He stated that he could have learned new skills by using his flexible work schedule but he did not try. This made him feel guilty and disappointed at himself. K5 expressed admiration for one servicemember in his barracks, who studied very hard in his spare time and finally got admission in college during his military service. These statements showed that young Korean men usually feel pressured to embrace neoliberal subjectivities, and their masculinities appear to be highly contingent upon their access to good careers. Participants’ ambivalent feelings towards discharge from the military were also linked to the neoliberal manhood. K2, K7, and K10 stated that as the day of discharge came closer, they were excited but at the same time, they felt anxiety and pressure about their future. They were isolated from wider society for a long time and got used to military life, although this did not mean that a “military soul” was completely forged inside them. They could not help but worry that they might not be able to keep up with others in college or workplace and to successfully adjust to a rapidly changing society.

Intense pressure by neoliberal trend was also reflected in the participants’ perceptions of military service. More than half of the participants thought that military service was not necessary to become a more mature man, saying that there would be more valuable and productive life experience to replace military service. However, at the same time, they believed that through military service, they cultivated “a sense of responsibility and independence”, “leadership skills”, and learned “the way to interact with people from diverse background”. This implied that participants negotiated meanings assigned to their military service, seeing to what extent it helped or hindered their achievement of neoliberal manhood. This ambivalent view on military service showed that participants’ military and civilian life could not be totally separate and accordingly, their constructions of militarized masculinities were influenced by wider society as well as by the military itself (Harnois, 2017).

From my participants’ statements, becoming a good provider, embodying neoliberal manhood, and completing military service seemed to be inextricably intertwined with each other. However, a careful analysis of implicit, unstated and condensed meanings from their statements revealed that they experienced intense tensions between societal hegemonic masculine norms and their self-conceptualizations.

Construction of Militarized Masculinities as a Complex Process

In many respects, participants’ elaboration on military culture and practices conformed to existing feminist analysis of gender and the military. Like other national armies, the hegemonic masculinity in the Korean military was characterized by physical fitness, endurance of hardships, self-discipline, and heterosexuality. Coercive hierarchy based on rank, hypermasculine activities, and an extreme degree of conformity and group pressure were also prevalent (Moon, 2005a). However, there was a variation in the extent to which participants engaged in these practices and internalized military norms.

Baisc training, where military socialization begins through exhaustive military initiation (Soeters et al., 2006), put participants in an extremely stressful environment, coupled with isolation, fatigue, tension and the use of vicious language (Davidson, 2020). In every training and inspection, K7 was reprimanded loudly for his failures and treated by instructors in a brutal and inhumane way. He was in deep emotional distress in the basic training to the extent that he felt suicidal. However, basic training appeared very important in forming comradeship among recruits and enhancing self-esteem. K1 mentioned that through strenuous physical training, he felt “kind of a bond” with other recruits. Particularly for those who described themselves as “manly men”, vigorous-intensity exercises were preferred. K6 saw basic training as the time for challenging himself and strengthening physical and mental toughness, not for suffering. K9 also thought that basic training should have been more arduous and harsher when he finished it. The rest of the participants also valued their improved ability to cope with physical demands through basic training, which led to the development of mental endurance as well.

All participants pointed out hyper-masculine practices such as bullying, hazing, and sexual objectification of women as very common in the military. K6 recollected one episode, which could be categorized as a severe abusive practice.

In my barracks, there was one guy who snored very loudly. Some of his superiors didn’t let him sleep for two or three days. Since then, he didn’t snore any longer. This was terribly brutal.

K10 used the term “militarization” directly to express how he became more aggressive and violent as he moved up the ranks. He swore “like a trooper” even for a trivial thing. For example, he cursed his subordinates when they did not do shoe-shining. He saw this as a process of militarization. Although he did not have intention to inflict pain and humiliation on his subordinates, he just repeated what his superiors had done to him. K10 also mentioned sexual harassment.

One senior soldier forced his subordinate to go through the motions of sucking his penis. Then other soldiers around this guy made fun of him saying, “you are even doing this!” This kind of behavior is not permitted now but when I served, it was just like pulling pranks among guys.

Sexual objectification of women constituted a big part of hypermasculine military culture. Use of prostitution on military leave, detailed depictions of sexual relations, and boasting about sexual exploits were common themes emerging during the interview. Reactions to this talk varied from person to person. While some participants felt very uncomfortable with objectifying and devaluing women for men’s sexual pleasure, others found it interesting because they had not experienced this before. However, regardless of how much they were involved in this practice, all participants said that this culture in homo-social settings did not fit their own identities and distanced themselves from men who actively took part in “sexual dirty talk”. Particularly, K7 projected overt displays of sexual prowess and description of women as the passive sex-object onto less educated groups of men. He thought that these men were “uneducated” and “pathetic”. Although only K7 associated men’s practice of sexual objectification of women with educational level, this finding was notable in that the assessment of other men and the creation of invisible hierarchies between men even in the military were intimately linked with pressures and demands of good education.

As empirical studies have shown, participants tended to create masculine hierarchies in the military according to various factors (Barrett, 1996; Hinojosa, 2010). Participants who served as commissioned officers created bounded space between them and enlisted soldiers. They (K4, K8, ad K9) identified professionalized rationality, responsibility and self-discipline as a source of officer identities and differentiated themselves from less mature masculinities, which were projected onto the group of enlisted soldiers. Military branch was one of those factors too. While the former Army members stated that the Army soldiers had a stronger sense of duty and were more dedicated, physically fit, and thus, closer to “real soldiers” (K6, K9, K10), the former Air Force members stressed the possession of expertise, skilled use of specialist equipment, and more developed military culture as their main sources of military identity (K1, K3, K4, and K7). The Army was viewed as “too aggressive, hypermasculine, and backward” by these four participants too.

Military roles were referred to by almost all participants as a marker of diverse military identities. Military roles varied from general administration to combat-related roles and how participants felt about their roles also varied from person to person. Among various military roles, whether participants performed combat-related roles was strongly related to the development of military identities. During K10’s service, there was a bombardment from North Korea on Yeonpyeong Island, hitting both military and civilian targets and subsequently, artillery engagement between South and North took place. During this critical time, K10 was put into emergency operation as an artilleryman. He had to observe the North Korean military movements for 8 hours every day and be ready to fire artillery in case any sign of armed attack was detected. Although this role was “extremely stressful and challenging” and he felt the fear of death for the first time in his life, he was very proud of his duty for national defense. Other than this emergency operation, K10 mentioned ceremonial occasions, such as passing-out parades and tough military training, and talked of his own sense of identification with other servicemembers with whom he had developed comradeship.

Other participants, whose roles were less combat-involved but more administrative and maintenance jobs, tended to focus on how the human capital acquired in the military was transferable to the civilian labor market. They did not usually see their roles as imperatives for national security and themes such as strong bond formation with other servicemembers, military-specific skills and expertise did not often emerge. Rather, they made personal meanings out of their military service in that they obtained necessary skills for their future socio-economic life. K1 said that:

Before enlistment, I used to spread myself too thinly and I wasn’t able to finish even one thing properly. One valuable thing learned in the military was how to complete my task even if it did not go well at the beginning. This still helps me work efficiently at my current workplace.

In the same vein, K3 emphasized how he was able to develop his job competency through military service, mentioning collective responsibility and more effective ways to communicate and work with senior personnel.

Participants had mixed feelings towards their military service and masculinities constructed during their service. On the one hand, given that military service is one of the few experiences the majority of adult Korean men share with one another (Moon, 2005b), participants believed that they would not be excluded from mainstream society. On the other hand, however, they identified that their self-conceptualizations of masculinity did not fit masculine ideals in the military. Even K9, who voluntarily extended his service for 7 years after the completion of mandatory military service, shared difficulties adjusting to “tough and aggressive” military environment. He also mentioned the need to reform the Korean military to ensure a culture of respect for human rights. Therefore, it would be inappropriate to homogenize Korean militarized masculinities as aggressive and violent.

Ambivalence Towards Female Soldiers

Most participants’ perceptions of female soldiers were based on traditional gendered assumptions. When asked about the full integration of women into combat unit, six participants (K2, K5, K6, K8, K9, and K10) said that women’s weaker physical condition would limit their participation in combat operations. K9 added that:

Most female soldiers do administrative tasks and they are outstanding. However, there is an obvious limitation of their physical strength. If we were in real combat, female soldiers would be the ones we [male soldiers] should protect. Actually, in the field training, male soldiers had to do extra guard duty for women because they couldn’t do it by themselves.

This view implied that women soldiers, who want to be assigned combat roles, must be as capable of fitting in as their male counterparts, emphasizing the essential physical ability to fight, which is uncompromising to members of the combat unit. Gendered protection norm, which “confirms men as protectors and women (and children) as those who need protection” (Tidblad-Lundholm, 2020, p. 674) was also frequently mentioned by other participants.

The interesting thing was most participants stated that they advocated gender equality and understood that women soldiers could be easily sexually objectified and excluded from the unit’s culture of “band of brothers” (Weitz, 2015, p. 171). However, they considered those difficulties inevitable and thought that women should fit in with their male colleagues and not vice versa because the military was originally a male-dominated institution. Particularly, sexual objectification of military women was very prevalent. K9 said that this practice was taken for granted because soldiers were men with “high sex drive”. K2 mentioned a middle-aged single female Personnel Officer in his unit, who was thought to be very hysterical by her subordinates. These examples showed that military women, despite their higher rank with more power and authority, were usually viewed in terms of their sexual characteristics. As noted above, this culture of sexism in the military appeared to be justified by men’s innate traits.

However, most participants were not aware that their own masculinities and behaviors constituted military culture and this in turn hugely influenced female soldiers. For this reason, they could not link themselves to the making of precarious environment where female members could be the most marginalized and excluded. There was almost no comment on what needs to be done to achieve gender equality or improve the lives of female soldiers.

Despite the prevalence of stereotypical views on female soldiers, two participants, K3 and K4, gained a new perspective on female soldiers during their service. K3 admired a female aviator he worked with in the Air Force. He said that “even many male candidates quitted in the middle of the test but this woman endured all hardships and took a position in the end”. He added that her leadership was more inclusive, less dominant and more dialogue-oriented than that of males. K4 explained in more detail how his view on women changed through military service.

I was trained with female officer candidates in the basic training. All of them passed the test, which was very tough physically and mentally, and transformed into strong soldiers. Our society has instilled what women should be like, such as being docile, weak, and nurturing. However, my experience disproved this. Some of my female colleagues still remain in the military and do a great job.

K4 also pointed out the structural dimension of gender inequality in the military.

One of the big problems in the military is women soldiers have much less opportunities to get promoted or to reach a higher position, since the military is a male-dominated, masculine institution. Basically, this kind of problem is caused not by the individual competence, but by the system and structure of the military.

Given that most participants naturalized gender difference and justified gendered division of labor, K4’s view was very notable. He came to question the social construction of women as physically weak and unable to do what men do and concluded that difficulties military women usually encountered were caused by the patriarchal system of the military. These examples showed that there is always variation in how military service, as an individualized experience, influences soldiers’ individual identities, perceptions and behavioral outcomes (Brooke & Peck, 2019).

Positive Perceptions of Softer Militarized Masculinities

Some participants mentioned “caring”, “understanding”, “respectful”, “not domineering” and “willing to listen to and help others” as the ideal characteristics of being a good soldier. K3 and K4 explained this, describing exemplary military personnel they had worked with. K3 said:

There were two senior officers. While one officer insulted me many times using his high position, another officer was very understating and caring. He tried to communicate with his subordinates rather than giving a command. Even in an urgent situation, he asked me first if I could do a certain task and explained why I should do it, not saying “just do what I order”. He seemed to base his work ethic on equal partnership. I could see that through his way of interacting with his subordinates and his efforts to encourage them.

K4, who worked as an assistant to the General in his unit, was very impressed that the General treated all his subordinates with politeness and respect. K4 added:

Because of him [the General], my idea about masculinity changed. He didn’t misuse his power and authority and didn’t emphasize hierarchy. Instead, he showed so-called “servant leadership”. Nobody talked behind his back. He was such an exemplary, respectable soldier.

K5 and K6 spoke of their peers with admiration. Although it was harder for soldiers to be patient and kind to others as they moved up the ranks, K5’s peer always tried to be understanding and nice to his subordinates. One of K6’s peers joined the military at a very late age and a few senior soldiers, who were younger than him, wanted to show dominance over him. K6 said:

He was very humble, thoughtful and tried to correct wrong military practices such as physical abuse and bullying in his barrack. Many younger soldiers relied on him and asked for help when they had difficulties. He ended up getting along well with those younger seniors who provoked him.

These examples showed that conventionally feminized attributes could be newly valued and incorporated into softer masculinities even in the hypermasculine military context (Duncanson, 2015).

The interesting thing was K5 and K6’s attitudes towards softer masculinities appeared to be affected by neoliberal manhood. Mentioning softer masculinities embodied by his peer, K5 also pointed out that “he was never lazy and tried to do something productive all the time”. “Unlike most men in the military, he never wasted his time”. Emphasizing this, K5 stated that he learned a lot about “self-development” and “time-management” from his peer even in the strictly limited military environment. In line with this, K6 also mentioned his peer’s good personal background. According to K6, the fact that his peer had graduated from one of the most prestigious universities in Korea and worked in the financial sector in the US before enlistment may have affected the other soldiers’ attitudes toward him. That is, his good personal background with high socioeconomic status made him more admirable. As noted above, this confirmed that participants’ masculinities were bound up as much in the production of successful neoliberal self as military service.

Conclusion

In this article, I have focused on exploring challenges to hegemonic constructions of militarized masculinities in the neoliberal era among former servicemen. Using South Korea as a case study, I have examined how former conscripts conceptualized and made sense of their ideas and practices of masculinities in light of their military service. Through a careful, in-depth analysis of their narratives, I have identified both instances, where the traditional understandings of militarized masculinities were reproduced and challenged. Using different symbolic resources of the military, my participants created masculine hierarchies that subordinated others while simultaneously placing their own perceived characteristics in positions of superiority and dominance. Female soldiers were not considered to be suitable for all tasks performed by male soldiers. In this regard, hegemonic militarized masculinities were reproduced. However, in many instances, my participants questioned hegemonic masculine norms both in wider society and in the military, which do not always correspond to each other (Kronsell, 2006). Many of them felt pressure to embrace and achieve neoliberal manhood and a good provider standard. This caused tensions among them even during their military service. Besides, as individuals who were profoundly affected by “New Men” discourse, most of my participants distanced themselves from traditional macho men and did not actively engage in hypermasculine military practices. Rather, they valued softer masculinities, and some of them showed a progressive change in their perceptions of female soldiers through experiences working alongside women.

These findings provide valuable insights into the possibility of change in hegemonic militarized masculinities at the individual level. As proven in many empirical studies, the gender regime of the military is particularly resistant to change (Sasson-Levy, 2011). However, individual gender identity is not fixed, but constantly changing, with the influence of changes in social and cultural environment (Riley, 2019). Furthermore, as my examination demonstrates, in reality, there is always tension, and a blurring of lines, between military and civilian spheres and identities (Bulmer & Eichler, 2017). Therefore, while not being totally dismantled, I conclude that under neoliberal transformation of Korean society, hegemonic constructions of militarized masculinities are challenged at the micro-level.

Despite those insights, this study has one unignorable limitation. All study participants were the educated, socio-economic elites, who do not represent the entire society. This means that men who do not belong to middle-to-upper class may have significantly different experiences and views, regarding their military service and masculinities. Therefore, to get a more comprehensive understanding of changes in hegemonic militarized masculinities, further future research would need a nuanced examination of classed social relations.