Toward a solid philosophical foundation of animal consciousness research: bridging some conceptual gaps

Abstract

In his book “A Philosophy for the Science of Animal Consciousness,” Walter Veit attempts to provide a philosophical foundation for the science of animal consciousness, especially focusing on hedonic evaluation. While he highlights an important aspect of phenomenal consciousness, several conceptual issues warrant further examination. The first one is the role of evaluation. Veit argues that hedonic evaluation explains the origin of consciousness, but it seems implausible for conscious animals to have the evaluative aspect alone. Instead, the origin(s) of consciousness may have linked to the capacity for making prediction that combine both perceptive and evaluative aspects. Second, it is necessary to distinguish between creature and state consciousness for discussing subjective unity. Autonomous movements of octopus arms do not necessarily imply multiple conscious subjects within one body. Alternatively, an octopus may experiences “switching” within a single phenomenal field between conflicting perceptions as in binocular rivalry. Lastly, the adaptivity of consciousness requires scrutiny. Just as different animal phyla show various body plans, the neuroarchitecture of consciousness may be implemented in different ways among animals. Specific mentalities may be fine-tuned to specific lifestyles, similarly to specific adaptation of animal bodies. It appears that the “adaptivity” of ground plans (e.g., vertebrate body and vertebrate consciousness) makes no sense or must be considered differently from the adaptivity of specific character states (e.g., the body shape and food preferences of a bat). The current analysis could help improve Veit’s proposal, linking it to previous accounts and establishing a solid philosophical foundation for this research field.