This article proposes a philosophical foundation for a new understanding of natural and artificial creativity based on a notion of relational creativity that encompasses both human and nonhuman creativity. We combine the inspiration from computational creativity with proposals from philosophy of technology and philosophy of organisms and discuss the ideas presented through an imaginary scenario based on the interaction between a creative machine and a locked-in syndrome patient. By doing so, we attempt to discuss why it is valuable to incorporate Gilbert Simondon’s notions of autonomy, integration, and amplification, as creativity features that can be candidates to substitute categories as hard to assess as novelty, surprise, and value.
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