The traditional approach in cognitive sciences holds that cognition is a matter of manipulating abstract symbols following certain rules. According to this view, the body is merely an input/output device, which allows the computational system—the brain—to acquire new input data by means of the senses and to act in the environment following its commands. In opposition to this classical view, defenders of embodied cognition (EC) stress the relevance of the body in which the cognitive agent is embedded in their explanation of cognitive processes. From a representationalist framework regarding our conscious experience, in this article, I will offer a novel argument in favor of EC and show that cognition constitutively—and no merely causally—depends upon body activity beyond that in the brain. In particular, I will argue that in order to solve the problem derived from the empirical evidence in favor of the possibility of shifted spectrum, representationalist should endorse the view that experiences concern its subject: the content of experience is de se. I show that this claim perfectly matches the phenomenological observation and helps explaining the subjective character of the experience. Furthermore, I argue that entertaining this kind of representation constitutively depends on bodily activity. Consequently, insofar as cognition depends on consciousness, it is embodied.
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