This study investigates groups' ability to manage resources under high and low scarcity. We offer a contingency model to reconcile competing predictions in the literature: Cooperative group behavior is moderated by group communication and the distribution of resources. A sample of 208 undergraduate students role-played I of 4 "division managers" in a fictional organization. They made independent organizational resource withdrawal decisions. Three independent variables were manipulated: (a) level of resource replenishment, (b) group communication prior to decision making, and (c) access to the resource. Our findings indicated strong support for the hypothesized effect of communication and moderate support for the effect of resource distribution. Results suggest that a decline in scarcity increases cooperation only when groups are allowed to communicate and when there is equal access to resources. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings for group behavior in organizations are discussed, and future directions for research are offered.
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