Prior CEO succession research has been inconclusive, and studies suffer from threats to external validity from sampling limitations. This study uses 219 succession events over a 2-year period to investigate the antecedents and consequences of CEO successor type. Our findings suggest that institutional ownership interacts with firm performance to influence successor choice. Firm performance subsequent to the succession is not influenced by the successor's origin.
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