This article contributes to researchers’ understanding of interfirm collaboration by examining the interpartner relationship in terms of cooperative behavior. In particular, this article focuses on the effect that a firm’s perception of its partner’s behavior has on the firm’s own behavior. Noncooperative behavior is distinguished by omission and by commission. By analyzing questionnaire data from a sample of 81 companies, it is shown that a firm’s perception of its partner’s behavior has a stronger association with the firm’s own behavior when the partner is perceived to behave noncooperatively by commission than by omission.
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