Abstract
This paper investigates the supplier’s pricing problem under upfront reservation discount (URD) contracts where the buyer reserves products in advance and then adjusts the purchase quantity based on realized end-market demand. A key challenge is that the supplier typically has limited data to estimate the demand distribution and possesses inferior information compared to the buyer. To address the challenges of distributional ambiguity and information asymmetry, we develop a refined distributionally robust optimization model for the supplier’s URD pricing to maximize her worst-case profit. To better infer true demand patterns, beyond the conventional reliance on historical demand data, our approach leverages past transaction records involving supplier–buyer interactions through the inverse optimization underlying the first-order conditions of the buyer’s newsvendor behavior. Then, a general Wasserstein
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