Abstract
With the rapid development of the sharing economy, many traditional manufacturers gravitate toward the paradigm shift to embrace product/service sharing with B2C (i.e., business-to-consumer) and P2P (i.e., peer-to-peer) sharing models. We develop a duopoly model to investigate the strategic decisions of competing manufacturers regarding three product-sharing strategies: no-sharing (i.e., sales-only), P2P sharing (i.e., sharing products on a P2P platform in addition to sales), and B2C sharing (i.e., renting products with add-ons on a B2C platform in addition to sales). The findings reveal that P2P sharing and B2C sharing play distinct roles in a competitive environment. P2P sharing has a scale effect, incentivizing manufacturers to expand market share and increase profitability. B2C sharing has a price discrimination effect, enabling the high-quality manufacturer to enhance price competitiveness and achieve higher profits. Moreover, the equilibrium outcomes for manufacturers depend on the quality difference and the add-on value. When the add-on value is low and the quality difference is high, both manufacturers prefer the P2P sharing strategy. Otherwise, manufacturers are more inclined to differentiate their sharing strategies, with the low-quality manufacturer favoring P2P sharing and the high-quality manufacturer preferring B2C sharing. Furthermore, compared with manufacturers adopting the no-sharing strategy, the low-quality manufacturer and the high-quality manufacturer are in (i) a lose–win situation when both adopt the P2P strategy; (ii) a win–win situation when manufacturers prefer the differentiated strategy. Notably, irrespective of the sharing strategy adopted, consumer surplus and social welfare are invariably augmented relative to the no-sharing scenario. The relative magnitudes of consumer surplus and social welfare under different equilibrium strategies are influenced by the quality difference and the add-on value. By extending the model, we derive further insights and demonstrate that the main results are robust under some conditions.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
