The theory of bounded rationality harbors assumptions that lead to an understanding of human nature conflicting with observation. Arguments are presented explaining why the concept of bounded rationality will ultimately interfere with progress in cognitive science and why the concept presents an inadequate view of human nature to students of decision making.
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