Many states, focusing on the protection of enterprise-dependent nonshareholders, have passed statutes that protect companies from takeovers. These statutes shift the balance of power along the existing shareholder/manager axis and alter the essence of corporate purpose. These issues and their implications for shareholders, corporate governance, and society at large are discussed.
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