What conditions must be present for multinational companies (MNCs) to benefit from corruption? We argue that corrupt acts by organizations can be profitable if four conditions are met: there must be an opportunity to do so, the risks must be perceived as low, the organization must be willing to engage in corruption, and it must have some skill in converting such acts into organizational advantages. We believe all of these conditions are necessary for organizational corruption to “pay off.” We argue that these conditions would most likely be present in MNCs from corrupt environments investing in other countries rife with corruption. However, if each of the conditions must be present for the return on corruption to be sufficient, each also offers opportunities to eliminate organizational corruption.
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