This article investigates the role of boards in founder-managed firms with concentrated ownership in emerging markets. The literature frequently suggests that in this type of companies, boards have little influence on the corporate decision making. The article conducts a case study of AFK Sistema—a large Russian founder-managed firm with concentrated ownership. We observe that, contrary to the expectations, in this company, the founder provided real authority to the board, at the same time focusing on recruiting independent (mainly foreign) members. Based on this case, we argue that selectively empowering boards in this type of ownership setting could be beneficial for the firm: Selective empowerment is a source of intrinsic motivation for the independent board members, making them proactively search for new projects and assist in their implementation on behalf of the firm. As a result, the company can overcome a number of important barriers in its development.
AlmazanA.SuarezJ. (2003). Entrenchment and severance pay in optimal governance structures. Journal of Finance, 58, 519-548.
3.
ArnoldD. J.QuelchJ. A. (1998). New strategies in emerging markets. Sloan Management Review, 40, 7-20.
4.
AudretschD. B.LehmannE. (2006). Entrepreneurial access and absorption of knowledge spillovers: Strategic board and managerial composition for competitive advantage. Journal of Small Business Management, 44, 155-166.
5.
BagilioniA.ColomboL. (2013). The efficiency view on corporate boards: Theory and evidence. Applied Economics, 45, 497-510.
6.
BankewitzM. (2016). Boards’ different advisory tasks: What makes board members use their knowledge?American Journal of Management, 16, 54-69.
7.
BaronR. A. (2006). Opportunity recognition as pattern recognition: How entrepreneurs “connect the dots” to identify new business opportunities. Academy of Management Perspectives, 20, 104-119.
8.
BarrosoC.VillegasM. M.Perez-CaleroL. (2011). Board influence on a firm’s internationalization. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 19, 351-367.
9.
BaysingerB.HoskissonR. E. (1990). The composition of boards of directors and strategic control: Effects on corporate strategy. Academy of Management Review, 15, 72-87.
10.
BenzM. (2009). Entrepreneurship as a non-profit-seeking activity. International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal, 5, 23-44.
11.
BlackB. (2001). The corporate governance behavior and market value of Russian firms. Emerging Markets Review, 2, 89-108.
12.
BoisotM.ChildJ. (1996). From fiefs to clans and network capitalism. Administrative Science Quarterly, 41, 600-628.
13.
BoixC.SvolikM. W. (2013). The foundations of limited authoritarian government: Institutions, commitment, and power-sharing in dictatorships. Journal of Politics, 75, 300-316.
14.
BooneA. L.FieldL. C.KarpoffJ. M.RajehaC. G. (2007). The determinants of corporate board size and independence. Journal of Financial Economics, 85, 66-101.
15.
BorchO. J.HuseM. (1993). Informal strategic networks and boards of directors. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 18, 23-36.
16.
BoydB. (1990). Corporate linkages and organizational environment: A test of the resource dependence model. Strategic Management Journal, 11, 419-430.
17.
BoydB. (1994). Board control and CEO compensation. Strategic Management Journal, 15, 335-344.
18.
BrandesP.DharwadkarR.SuhS. (2016). I know something you don’t know! The role of linking pin directors in monitoring and incentive alignment. Strategic Management Journal, 37, 964-981.
19.
BrunningeO.NordqvistM.WiklundJ. (2007). Corporate governance and strategic change in SMEs: The effects of ownership, board composition and top management teams. Small Business Economics, 29, 295-308.
20.
CalderB. J.StawM. B. (1975). The self-perception of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 31, 599-605.
21.
CarlileP. R. (2004). Transferring, translating and transforming: An integrative framework for managing knowledge across boundaries. Organization Science, 15, 555-568.
22.
CarpenterM. A.WestphalJ. D. (2001). Strategic context of external network ties: Examining the impact of director appointments on board involvement in strategic decision-making. Academy of Management Journal, 4, 639-660.
23.
CarsrudA.BrännbackM. (Eds.). (2009). Understanding the entrepreneurial mind: Opening the black box. Heidelberg, Germany: Springer.
24.
CerasoliC. P.NicklinJ. M.FordM. T. (2014). Intrinsic motivation and extrinsic incentives jointly predict performance: A 40-year meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 140, 980-1009.
25.
CertoS. T. (2003). Influencing initial public offering investors with prestige: Signaling with board structures. Academy of Management Review, 28, 432-446.
26.
ChenH. L.HsuW. T.ChangC. Y. (2016). Independent directors’ human and social capital, firm internationalization and performance implications: An integrated agency-resource dependence view. International Business Review, 25, 859-871.
27.
ChernykhL. (2008). Ultimate ownership and control in Russia. Journal of Financial Economics, 88, 169-192.
28.
ClaessensS.YurtogluB. B. (2013). Corporate governance in emerging markets: A survey. Emerging Markets Review, 15, 1-33.
CongerJ. A.KanungoR. N. (1988). The empowerment process: Integrating theory and practice. Academy of Management Review, 13, 471-482.
31.
ConnellyB. L.CertoS. T.IrelandR. D.ReutzelC. R. (2011). Signaling theory: A review and assessment. Journal of Management, 37, 39-67.
32.
CorbettaG.SalvatoC. (2004). The board of directors in family firms: One size fits all?Family Business Review, 17, 119-134.
33.
CovinJ. G.SlevinD. P. (1991). A conceptual model of entrepreneurship as firm behavior. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 16, 7-25.
34.
DailyC. M.DaltonD. R. (1992). Financial performance of founder-managed versus professionally managed small corporations. Journal of Small Business Management, 30, 25-34.
35.
DailyC. M.McDougallP. P.CovinJ. G.DaltonD. R. (2002). Governance and strategic leadership in entrepreneurial firms. Journal of Management, 28, 387-412.
36.
DaltonD.DailyC.EllstrandA.JohnsonJ. (1998). Meta-analytic review of board composition, leadership structure and financial performance. Strategic Management Journal, 19, 269-290.
37.
DavisG. F.CobbJ. A. (2010). Resource dependence theory: Past and future. In Bird SchoonhovenC.DobbinF. (Eds.), Stanford’s organization theory renaissance, 1970–2000 (pp. 21-42). Bingley, UK: Emerald.
38.
de JongA.SongM.SongL. Z. (2013). How lead founder personality affects new venture performance: The mediating role of team conflict. Journal of Management, 39, 1825-1854.
39.
DemirbasD.YukhanaevA. (2011). Independence of board of directors, employee relation and harmonisation of corporate governance: Empirical evidence from Russian listed companies. Employee Relations, 33, 444-471.
40.
DenisD. J.SarinA. (1999). Ownership and board structures in publicly traded corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, 52, 187-222.
DesenderK.AguileraR. V.CrespiR.Garcia-CestonaM. (2013). When does ownership matter? Board characteristics and behavior. Strategic Management Journal, 34, 823-842.
44.
DielmanM.BoddewynJ. J. (2012). Using organizational structure to buffer political ties in emerging markets: A case study. Organization Studies, 33, 71-95.
45.
DolgopyatovaT.LibmanA.PetrovI.YakovlevA. (2015). Rol’ soveta direktorov v rossiyskikh rastushchikh kompaniyakh [Role of the Board of Directors in Russian Growing Companies: Experience of AFK Sistema]: Opyt AFK Sistema. Rossiyskiy Zhurnal Menedzhnemta [Russian Management Journal], 13, 91-112, 129-148.
46.
DolgopyatovaT.LibmanA.YakovlevA. (2018). The unintended benefits of empowering boards in conglomerates: The case study of AFK Sistema. Journal of East European Management Studies, 23, 177-202.
47.
DonellyR.KellyP. (2005). Ownership and board structure in Irish PLCs. European Management Journal, 23, 730-740.
48.
DulyakU. (2013a). Determinants of the boards of directors evolution in Russian public and private companies. Moscow, Russia: National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE Working Paper No. WP1/2013/01).
49.
DulyakU. (2013b). Kachestvennyi analiz mesta i roli soveta direktorov v deyatel’nosti rossiyskikh kompaniy [A qualitative analysis of the place and the role of the board of directors in the activity of Russian companies]. Korportativnye Finansy [Corporate Finance], 2, 22-32.
EstrinS.PrevezerM. (2011). The role of informal institutions in corporate governance: Brazil, Russia, India and China compared. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 28, 41-67.
52.
FarrellJ.RabinM. (1996). Cheap talk. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10, 103-118.
53.
FerreiraJ. (2001). Corporate entrepreneurship: A strategic and structural perspective. New England Journal of Entrepreneurship, 4, 59-70.
54.
FiegenerM. K. (2005). Determinants of board participation in the strategic decisions of small corporations. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 29, 627-650.
55.
FilatochevI.TomsS.WrightM. (2006). The firm’s strategic dynamics and corporate governance life-cycle. International Journal of Managerial Finance, 2, 256-279.
56.
FilippovS. (2010). Russian companies: The rise of new multinationals. International Journal of Emerging Markets, 5, 307-332.
57.
FilippovS. (2012). Emerging Russian multinational companies: Managerial and corporate challenges. European Journal of International Management, 6, 323-341.
58.
ForbesD. P.MillikenF. J. (1999). Cognition and corporate governance: Understanding boards of directors as strategic decision-making groups. Academy of Management Review, 24, 489-505.
GabrielssonJ. (2007). Correlates of board empowerment in small companies. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 31, 687-711.
61.
GabrielssonJ.HuseM. (2005). “Outside” directors in SME boards: A call for theoretical reflections. Corporate Board: Role, Duties and Composition, 1, 28-37.
62.
GedajlovicE.LubatkinM. H.SchulzeW. S. (2004). Crossing the threshold from founder management to professional management: A governance perspective. Journal of Management Studies, 41, 899-912.
63.
GehlbachS.KeeferP. (2012). Private investment and the institutionalization of collective action in autocracies: Ruling parties and legislatures. Journal of Politics, 74, 621-635.
64.
GeorgeG.WoodD. R.KhanR. (2001). Networking strategy of boards: Implications for small and medium-sized enterprises. Entrepreneurship and Regional Development, 13, 269-285.
65.
GoldenB. R.ZajacE. J. (2001). When will boards influence strategy? Inclination × power = strategic change. Strategic Management Journal, 22, 1087-1111.
66.
GurievS.RachinskyA. (2005). The role of oligarchs in Russian capitalism. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19, 131-150.
67.
HambrickD. C.WerderA. V.ZajacE. J. (2008). New directions in corporate governance research. Organization Science, 19, 381-385.
68.
HavemanH. A.KhaireM. V. (2004). Survival beyond succession? The contingent impact of founder succession on organizational failure. Journal of Business Venturing, 19, 437-463.
69.
HillmanA. J.CannellaA. A.PaetzoldR. L. (2000). The resource dependence role of corporate directors: Strategic adaptation of board composition in response to environmental change. Journal of Management Studies, 37, 235-256.
70.
HillmanA. J.DalzielT. (2003). Boards of directors and firm performance: Integrating agency and resource dependence perspectives. Academy of Management Review, 28, 383-396.
71.
HillmanA. J.ShorpshireC.CannellaA. (2007). Organizational predictors of women on corporate boards. Academy of Management Journal, 50, 941-952.
72.
HillmanA. J.WithersM. C.CollinsB. J. (2009). Resource dependence theory: A review. Journal of Management, 35, 1404-1427.
73.
HuseM. (1990). Board composition in small enterprises. Entrepreneurship and Regional Development, 2, 363-373.
74.
HuseM. (2000). Boards of directors in SMEs: A review and research agenda. Entrepreneurship and Regional Development, 12, 271-290.
75.
HuseM.HoskissonR.ZattoniA.ViganoR. (2011). New perspectives on board research: Changing the research agenda. Journal of Management & Governance, 15, 5-28.
76.
IwasakiI. (2007). Corporate law and governance mechanisms in Russia. In DallagoB.IwasakiI. (Eds.), Corporate restructuring and governance in transition economies. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave MacMillan.
77.
IwasakiI. (2008). The determinants of board composition in a transforming economy: Evidence from Russia. Journal of Corporate Finance, 14, 532-649.
78.
JohannissonB.HuseM. (2000). Recruiting outside board members in a small family business: An ideological challenge. Entrepreneurship and Regional Development, 12, 353-378.
79.
JohannisssonB. (1998). Personal networks in emerging knowledge-based firms: Spatial and functional patterns. Entrepreneurship and Regional Development, 10, 297-312.
80.
JohnsonS. J.SchnatterlyK.HillA. D. (2013). Board composition beyond independence: Social capital, human capital and demographics. Journal of Management, 39, 232-262.
81.
KatzD.KahnR. (1978). The social psychology of organizations. New York, NY: John Wiley.
82.
KorY. Y.SundaramurthyC. (2009). Experience-based human capital and social capital of outside directors. Journal of Management, 35, 981-1006.
83.
KozlovD. (2017, June19). Dosudebnoe uluchshenie investklimata [Improving investment climate before court]. Kommersant [Businessman]. Retrieved from https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3329390
84.
KuratkoD. F.IrelandR. D.CovinJ. G.HornsbyJ. S. (2005). A model of middle-level managers’ entrepreneurial behavior. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 29, 699-716.
85.
LangleyA. (1999). Strategies for theorizing from process data. Academy of Management Review, 24, 691-710.
86.
La PortaR.Lopez-de-SilanesF.ShleiferA. (1999). Corporate ownership around the world. Journal of Finance, 54, 471-517.
87.
LazarevaO.RachinskyA.StepanovS. (2007). A survey of corporate governance in Russia. Mimeo. Moscow, Russia: National Research University Higher School of Economics and New Economic School
88.
LeeJ. H.RobertsM. J. (2015). International returnees as outside directors: A catalyst for strategic adaptation under institutional pressure. International Business Review, 24, 594-604.
LiJ. (1994). Ownership structure and board composition: A multi-country test of agency theory predictions. Managerial and Decision Economics, 15, 359-368.
91.
LieschP. W.KnightG. A. (1999). Information internalization and hurdle rates in small and medium enterprise internationalization. Journal of International Business Studies, 30, 383-394.
92.
LockeE. A.CongerJ. A. (2000). Motivate performance through empowerment. In LockeE. (Ed.), The Blackwell handbook of principles of organizational behavior (pp. 137-149). Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
93.
LynallM. D.GoldenB. R.HillmanA. J. (2003). Board composition from adolescence to maturity: A multitheoretic view. Academy of Management Review, 28, 416-431.
94.
MacholdS.FarquharS. (2013). Board task evolution: A longitudinal field study in the UK. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 21, 147-164.
95.
MadhokA. (1998). The nature of multinational firm boundaries: Transaction costs, firm capabilities and foreign market entry mode. International Business Review, 7, 259-290.
96.
MalkovaI. (2016, November). Vladimir Evtushenkov: Mne absolyutno vsye ravno chto u menya zaberut [Vladimir Evtushenkov: I don’t care about what else they will take away from me]. Retrieved from https://republic.ru/posts/73114
97.
Mansilya-CruzA. (2011). The Westwards expansion of Russian multinationals. In BrennanL. (Ed.), The emergence of Southern multinationals (pp. 114-129). Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave MacMillan.
98.
MarquisC.RaynardM. (2015). Institutional strategies in emerging markets. Academy of Management Annals, 9, 291-335.
99.
MasulisR. W.MobbsS. (2014). Independent director incentives: Where do talented directors spend their limited time and energy?Journal of Financial Economics, 111, 406-429.
100.
MaynardM. T.GilsonL. L.MathieuJ. E. (2012). Empowerment—Fad or fab? A multilevel review of the past two decades of research. Journal of Management, 38, 1231-1281.
101.
MelkumovD. (2009). Institutional background as a determinant of board of directors’ internal and external roles: The case of Russia. Journal of World Business, 44, 94-103.
102.
MichailovaS.WormV. (2003). Personal networking in Russia and China: Blat and guanxi. European Management Journal, 21, 509-519.
103.
MillerD.LeeJ.ChangS.Le Breton-MillerI. (2009). Filling the institutional void: The social behavior and performance of family vs. non-family technology firms in emerging markets. Journal of International Business Studies, 40, 802-817.
104.
MuravyevA. (2017). Boards of directors in Russian publicly traded companies in 1998–2014: Structure, dynamics and performance effects. Economic Systems, 41, 5-25.
105.
MuravyevA.BerezinetsI. (2014). The structure of corporate boards and private benefits of control: Evidence from the Russian stock exchange. International Review of Financial Analysis, 34, 247-261.
106.
NaldiL.NordqvistM. (2009). Family firms venturing into international markets: A resource dependence perspective. Babson College Frontiers on Entrepreneurial Research, 28(14), Article 1.
107.
The National Code of Corporate Governance. (2010). Sovremennoe korporativnoe upravlenie v Rossii glazami zarubezhnykh biznesmenov i ekspertov [Modern corporate governance in Russia from the point of view of the foreign businessmen and experts]. Moscow, Russia: ‘National Code of Corporate Governance.
108.
O’HaganS. B.GreenM. B. (2002). Tacit knowledge transfer via interlocking directorates. Geografiska Annaler [Geographic Annals], 84, 49-63.
109.
OsterlohM.FreyB. S. (2005). Corporate governance for crooks? The case for corporate virtue (CREMA Working Paper No. 10). Zurich, Switzerland: CREMA
110.
PanibratovA. (2012). Russian multinationals: From regional supremacy to global level. Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
PengM. W.BuckT.FilatochevI. (2003). Do outside directors and new managers help improve firm performance? An exploratory study of Russian privatization. Journal of World Business, 38, 348-360.
113.
PengM. W.HeathP. S. (1996). The growth of the firm in planned economies in transition: Institutions, organizations, and strategic choice. Academy of Management Review, 21, 492-528.
114.
PengM. W.WangD. Y.JiangY. (2008). An institution-based view of international business strategy: A focus on emerging economies. Journal of International Business Studies, 39, 920-936.
115.
PfefferJ. (1972). Size and composition of corporate boards of directors: The organization and its environment. Administrative Science Quarterly, 17, 218-228.
116.
PfefferJ.SalancikG. R. (1978). The external control of organization: A resource-dependence perspective. New York, NY: Harper & Row.
117.
PhanP. H.WrightM.UcbasaranD.TanW.-L. (2009). Corporate entrepreneurship: Current research and Future development. Journal of Business Venturing, 24, 197-205.
118.
PolanyiM. (1966). The tacit dimension. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
119.
PrattM. G. (2009). For the lack of a boilerplate: Tips of writing up (and reviewing) qualitative research. Academy of Management Journal, 52, 856-862.
120.
PufferS. M.McCarthyD. J. (2011). Two decades of Russian business and management research: An institutional theory perspective. Academy of Management Perspectives, 25, 21-36.
121.
PuglieseA.MinichilliA.ZattoniA. (2014). Integrating agency and resource dependence theory: Firm profitability, industry regulation, and board task performance. Journal of Business Research, 67, 1189-1200.
122.
RajagopalanN.ZhangY. (2008). Corporate governance reforms in China and India: Challenges and opportunities. Business Horizons, 51, 55-64.
123.
RigoliniA. (2013). Corporate entrepreneurship and corporate governance: The influence of board of directors and owner identity. Milan, Italy: McGraw-Hill.
124.
RindovaV. P. (1999). What corporate boards have to do with strategy? A cognitive perspective. Journal of Management Studies, 36, 953-975.
125.
RobertsJ.McNultyT.StilesP. (2005). Beyond agency conceptions of the work of the non-executive director: Creating accountability in the boardroom. British Journal of Management, 16, S5-S26.
126.
Rossiyskaya Faramtsevtika. (2014, November8). Otmenena sdelka AFK Sistema i Fresenius Kabi [The deal of AFK Sistema and Fresenius Kabi is cancelled]. Rossiyskaya Faramtsevtika [Russian Pharmaceuticals]. Retrieved from http://pharmapractice.ru/111637
127.
RyanH. E.WigginsR. A. (2004). Who is in whose pocket? Director compensation, board independence and barriers to effective monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 73, 497-523.
SchumpeterJ. A. (2004). The theory of economic development. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers. (Original work published 1937)
130.
ShermanH. D.KashlakR. J.JoshiP. M. (1998). The effect of the board and executive committee characteristics on the degree of decentralization. Journal of International Management, 4, 311-335.
131.
ShipilovA. V.GreveH. R.RowleyT. J. (2010). When do interlocks matter? Institutional logics and the diffusion of multiple corporate governance practices. Academy of Management Journal, 53, 846-864.
132.
ShirokovaG.McDougall-CovinP. (2012). The role of social networks and institutions in the internationalization of Russian entrepreneurial firms: Do they matter?Journal of International Entrepreneurship, 10, 177-199.
SkaatesA. M.TikkanenH.LindblomJ. (2002). Relationships and project marketing success. Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing, 17, 389-406.
135.
SmallboneD.WelterF. (2001). The distinctiveness of entrepreneurship in transition economies. Small Business Economics, 16, 249-262.
136.
SpreitzerG. M. (2008). Taking stock: A review of more than twenty years of research on empowerment at work. In CooperC.BarlingJ. (Eds.), Handbook of organizational behavior (pp. 54-72). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
137.
StrikwerdaJ. (2003). An entrepreneurial model of corporate governance. Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, 3, 38-57.
138.
SullivanD. (1994). Measuring the degree of internationalization of a firm. Journal of International Business Studies, 25, 325-342.
139.
SurS.LvinaE.MagnanM. (2013). Why do boards differ? Because owners do: Assessing ownership impact on board composition. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 21, 373-389.
140.
TuggleC. S.SchnatterlyK.JohnsonR. A. (2010). Attention patterns in the boardroom: How board composition and processes affect discussion on entrepreneurial issues. Academy of Management Journal, 55, 550-571.
141.
UhlanerL. M.FlorenR. H.GeerlingsJ. R. (2007). Owner commitment and relational governance in privately-held firm: An empirical study. Small Business Economies, 29, 275-293.
142.
UhlanerL. M.WrightM.HuseM. (2007). Private firms and corporate governance: An integrated economic and management perspective. Small Business Economics, 29, 225-241.
143.
Van Den HeuvelJ.Van GilsA.VoordeckersW. (2006). Board roles in small and medium-sized family businesses: Performance and importance. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 14, 467-485.
144.
VillalongaB.AmitR. (2006). How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value?Journal of Financial Economics, 80, 385-417.
145.
VolonteC. (2015). Boards: Independent and committed directors?International Review of Law and Economics, 41, 25-37.
146.
VoordeckersW.Van GilsA.Van Den HeuvelJ. (2007). Board composition in small and medium-sized family firms. Small Business Management, 45, 137-156.
147.
WelchC.Marschan-PiekkariR.PenttinenH.TahvanianenM. (2002). Corporate elites as informants in qualitative international business research. International Business Review, 11, 611-628.
148.
WestphalJ. D. (1999). Collaboration in the boardroom: Behavioral and performance consequences of CEO-board social ties. Academy of Management Journal, 42, 7-24.
149.
WoodruffD. (2000). Rules for followers: Institutional theory and the new politics of economic backwardness in Russia. Politics and Society, 28, 437-482.
150.
WrightM.FilatotchevI.HoskissonR. E.PengM. W. (2005). Strategy research in emerging economies: Challenging the conventional wisdom. Journal of Management Studies, 42, 1-33.
151.
YakovlevA. (2006). The evolution of business-state interaction in Russia: From state capture to business capture?Europe-Asia Studies, 58, 1033-1056.
152.
YoungM. N.AhlstromD.BrutonG. D.ChanS. E. (2001). The resource dependence, service and control functions of boards of directors in Hong Kong and Taiwanese firms. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 18, 223-244.
153.
YoungM. N.PengM. V.AhlstromD.BrutonG. D.JiangY. (2008). Corporate governance in emerging economies: A review of the principal-principal perspective. Journal of Management Studies, 45, 196-220.
154.
ZahraS. A. (1996). Governance, ownership, and corporate entrepreneurship: The moderating impact of industry technological opportunities. Academy of Management Journal, 39, 1713-1735.
155.
ZahraS. A.FilatochevI.WrightM. (2009). How do threshold firms sustain corporate entrepreneurship? The role of boards and absorptive capacity. Journal of Business Venturing, 24, 248-260.
156.
ZahraS. A.NeubaumD. O.HuseM. (2000). Entrepreneurship in medium-size companies: Exploring the effects of ownership and governance systems. Journal of Management, 26, 947-976.
157.
ZahraS. A.NeubaumD. O.NaldiL. (2007). The effects of ownership and governance on SMEs’ international knowledge-based resources. Small Business Economics, 29, 309-327.
158.
ZahraS. A.PearceJ. A. (1989). Boards of directors and corporate financial performance: A review and integrative model. Journal of Management, 15, 291-334.
159.
ZhangX.BartolK. M. (2010). Linking empowering leadership and employee creativity: The influence of psychological empowerment, intrinsic motivation, and creative process engagement. Academy of Management Journal, 53, 107-128.
160.
ZimmermanM. A.ZeitzG. J. (2002). Beyond survival: Achieving new venture growth by building legitimacy. Academy of Management Journal, 27, 414-431.
