Abstract
Acknowledging that deconstruction had failed to catch on as a research method among management scholars, Weitzner argues for reconsidering Derrida's potential contributions to management scholarship—this time as an ethicist, whose core idea is that the hallmark of an ethical decision is that it is not amenable to rational decision processes. Illustrating the Derridean style of academic debate, he responds to criticisms of Derrida's ethical position as amoral by noting Derrida's declaration that such critics were not serious and by declaring that “in fact” their critique is incorrect. His demonstration of the value of Derrida's views consists of the contention that they are not inconsistent with some existing perspectives. This article argues that the Derridean view errs in portraying ethical decisions as necessarily noninstrumental and nonrational and contrasts it with Weber's view that noninstrumental action may nevertheless be rational. The very divergent practical implications of these opposing perspectives are examined.
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