A formal dyadic model of the arms acquisition process is developed and analyzed through computer simulation. A rational model produces behavior consistent with a powerful security dilemma. A spiral model, in which images of the opponent become more aggressive, sparking an arms race, emerges from the simulation for deterrent nations. In addition to these anticipated findings, the rational arms model suggests that competitive factors have their greatest impact for rivals near parity; noncompetitive forces may drive the decision for unbalanced dyads. Also unpredicted from previous formal work, only one member of a competitive dyad needs to favor disarmanent for both nations to disarm.
Abelson, R.
, & Levi, A. (1984). Decision making and decision theory. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology (3rd ed.). New York: Random House.
2.
Anderton, C. H.
(1985). A selected bibliography of arms race models and related subjects. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 8, 99-122.
3.
Brito, D.
, & Intriligator, M. (1985). Conflict, war, and redistribution. American Political Science Review, 79, 943-957.
4.
Farnham, B.
(1992). Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis: Insights from prospect theory. Political Psychology, 13, 205-236.
5.
Frank, M. W.
, & Taber, C. S. (1991). The calculus of voting reconsidered: A solution to the Downsian paradox based on prospect theory. Presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago.
6.
George, A.
, & Smoke, R. (1974). Deterrence in American foreign policy: Theory and practice. New York: Columbia University Press.
7.
Herz, J.
(1950). Idealist internationalism and the security dilemma. World Politics, 2, 13-27.
8.
Hudson, V. M.
(1991). Artificial intelligence and international politics. Boulder, CO: Westview.
9.
Intriligator, M. D.
, & Brito, D. L. (1984). Can arms races lead to the outbreak of war?Journal of Conflict Resolution, 28, 63-84.
10.
Isard, W.
(1988). Arms races, arms control, and conflict analysis. New York: Cambridge University Press.
11.
Isard, W.
, & Anderton, C. H. (1985). Arms race models: A survey and synthesis. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 8, 27-98.
12.
Jervis, R.
(1976). Perception and misperception in international politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
13.
Kahneman, D.
, & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, 47, 263-291.
14.
Kahneman, D.
, & Tversky, A. (1981). The framing of decision and the psychology of choice. Science, 211, 453-458.
15.
Kahneman, D.
, & Tversky, A. (1984). Choices, values, and frames. American Psychologist, 39, 341-350.
16.
Lambelet, J.
(1986). The formal ('economic') analysis of arms races: What-if anything-have we learned since Richardson?Conflict Management and Peace Science, 9, 1-18.
17.
McDermott, R.
(1992). Prospect theory in international relations: The Iranian hostage rescue mission. Political Psychology, 13, 237-264.
18.
McGuire, M.
(1965). Secrecy and the arms race. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
19.
Mclnerney, A.
(1992). Prospect theory and Soviet policy towards Syria, 1966-67. Political Psychology, 13, 265-282.
20.
Morrow, J.
(1989). A twist of truth: A reexamination of the effects of arms races on the occurrence of war. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 33, 500-529.
21.
Organski, A.F.K.
, & Kugler, J. (1980). The war ledger. Chicago: University of Chicago.
22.
Pfaltzgraff, R. L., Jr.
(1985). Arms limitation and national security. In J. Salmon, J. O'Leary, & R. Shultz (Eds.), Power, principles, and interests. Lexington, MA: Ginn.
23.
Richardson, L. F.
(1960). Arms and insecurity. Pittsburgh: Boxwood.
24.
Sanjian, G. S.
(1991). Great power arms transfers: Modeling the decision-making processes of hegemonic, industrial, and restrictive exporters. International Studies Quarterly, 35, 173-193.
25.
Saperstein, A. M.
(1991). The 'long peace'-Result of a bipolar competitive world?Journal of Conflict Resolution, 35, 68-79.
26.
Singer, J. D.
(1958). Threat perceptions and the armament-tension dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2, 90-105.
27.
Singer, J. D.
(1984). Deterrence, arms control, and disarmament. New York: University Press of America.
28.
Sullivan, M. P.
(1976). International relations: Theories and evidence. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
29.
Taber, C. S.
(1992). POLI: An expert system model of U.S. foreign policy belief systems. American Political Science Review, 86, 888-904.
30.
Taber, C. S.
, & Timpone, R. (1993). Pictures in the PC: Computational modeling and political psychology. In M. X. Delli Carpini, L. Huddy, & R. Y Shapiro (Eds.), New directions in political psychology. Greenwich, CT: JAI.
31.
Tversky, A.
, & Kahneman, D. (1990). Cumulative prospect theory: An analysis under uncertainty. Unpublished paper.
32.
Wallace, M. D.
(1977). Arms races and escalation: Some new evidence. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 23, 3-16.
33.
Wallace, M. D.
(1982). Armaments and escalation. International Studies Quarterly, 26, 37-56.
34.
Williams, J.
, & McGinnis, M. (1988). Sophisticated reaction in the U.S.-Soviet arms race: Evidence of rational expectations. American Journal of Political Science, 32, 968-995.
35.
Williams, J.
, & McGinnis, M. (1989). Change and stability in superpower rivalry. American Political Science Review, 83, 1101-1124.
