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Abstract

Attentiveness to and transparency about the methodological implications of the level of analysis selected for peace and conflict exercises constitute essential elements of good game design. The article explores the impact of level of analysis choices in the context of two key portions of exercises, scenario construction and role specification. It weighs the consequences of these choices in terms of the differing conclusions one can draw from exercises and potential pitfalls of careless choices. Finally, it argues that level of analysis considerations in game design parallels specific debates within segments of the social science literature, connections that are also explored in this article for their relevance to game design.

Keywords

attentiveness game design methodology good game design level of analysis peace and conflict exercises role specification scenario scenario construction social science transparency

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Designing Peace and Conflict Exercises

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References