A simultaneous double auction market with bid and offer cards was used in classes on the theory and history of money and financial institutions and occasionally in classes on the theory of games. The prime purpose in using this game was to teach the students how to construct process models of economic phenomena. The second purpose was to consider the properties of the double auction market. The third purpose was to interpret the experimental results and link them to theory.
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2.
Bachelier, L. (1964). Theorie de la spéculation (1900) [Theory of speculation]. In P. H. Cootner (Ed.), The random character of stock prices (pp. 17-18). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
3.
Bak, P., Paczuski, M., & Shubik, M. (1997). Price variations in a stock market with many agents. Physica A, 246, 430-453.
4.
Bosch-Domènech, A., & Sunder, S. (2000). Traching the invisible hand: Convergence of double auctions to competitive equilibrium. Computational Economics, 16, 257-284.
5.
Chamberlin, E. H. (1948). An experimental imperfect market. Journal of Political Economy, 56, 95-108.
6.
Davis, D. D., & Holt, C. A. (1993). Experimental economics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
7.
Dubey, P. (1982). Price-quantity strategic market games. Econometrica, 50, 111-126.
8.
Dubey, P., Geanakoplos, J., & Shubik, M. (1987). The revelation of information in strategic market games. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 16, 105-137.
9.
Dubey, P., Mas-Colell, A., & Shubik, M. (1980). Efficiency properties of strategic market games: An axiomatic approach. Journal of Economic Theory, 22, 339-362.
10.
Dubey, P., & Shubik, M. (1980). A strategic market game with price and quantity strategies. Zeitschrift für Nationalokonomie, 40(1-2), 25-34.
11.
Dubey, P., & Shubik, M. (1981). Information conditions, communication and general equilibrium. Mathematics of Operations Research, 6, 186-189.
12.
Farmer, J. D., Patelli, O., & Zovko, I. I. (2003). The predictive power of zero intelligence in financial markets. Unpublished manuscript, Santa Fe Institute.
13.
Friedman, D., & Rust, J. (Eds.). (1993). The double auction market: Institutions, theories and evidence. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
14.
Gale, D. (1986). Bargaining and competition Part 1: Characterization. Econometrica, 54, 785-806.
15.
Gode, D. K., & Sunder, S. (1997a). Allocative efficiency of markets with zero intelligence traders: Markets as a partial substitute for individual rationality. Journal of Political Economy, 101, 119-137.
16.
Gode, D. K., & Sunder, S. (1997b). What makes markets allocationally efficient. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 12, 603-630.
17.
Holt, C. A. (1999). Y2K bibliography of experimental economics and social science: Double auction markets. Available from http://www.people.virginia.edu/%7Ecah2k/day2k.htm
18.
Kagel, J. H., & Roth, A. E. (1995). Handbook of experimental economics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
19.
Klemperer, P. (2000). The economic theory of auctions (Vols. 1-2). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
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Lillo, F., Farmer, J. D., & Mantegna, R. N. (2000). Econophysics: Master curve for price-impact function. Nature, 121, 129-130.
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Mendelson, H. (1982). Market behavior in a clearing house. Econometrica, 50, 1505-1524.
22.
Rubinstein, A. (1989). Competitive equilibrium in a market with decentralized trade and strategic behavior: An introduction. In G. Feiwel (Ed.), The economics of imperfect competition and employment: Joan Robinson and beyond (pp. 243-259). New York: Macmillan.
23.
Rubinstein, A., & Wolinsky, A. (1985). Equilibrium in a market with sequential bargaining. Econometrica, 53, 113-150.
24.
Satterthwaite, M. A., & Williams, S. R. (1993). The Bayesian theory of the k-double auction. In D. Friedman & J. Rust (Eds.), The double auction market (pp. 99-124). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
25.
Shapley, L. S., & Shubik, M. (1971). The assignment game, I: The core. International Journal of Game Theory, 1, 111-130.
26.
Shubik, M. (1970). A 1970 note on a simulated stock market. Decision Sciences, 1, 129-141.
27.
Shubik, M. (1972). Commodity money, oligopoly, credit and bankruptcy in a general equilibrium model. Western Economic Journal, 11(1), 24-38.
28.
Shubik, M. (1999). The theory of money and financial institutions. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
29.
Shubik, M. (2002). The uses of teaching games in game theory classes and some experimental games. Simulation & Gaming, 33, 137-156.
30.
Smith, E., Farmer, J. D., Gillemot, L., & Krishnamurthy, S. (2002). Statistical theory of the continuous double auction (Santa Fe Institute Working Paper No. 02-10-057).
31.
Smith, V. L. (1962). An experimental study of competitive market behavior. Journal of Political Economy, 70, 111-137.
32.
Smith, V. L. (1965). Experimental auction markets and the Walrasian hypothesis. Journal of Political Economy, 73, 387-393.
33.
Smith, V. L., Suchanek, G. L., & Williams, A. W. (1988). Bubbles, crashes and endogenous expectations in experimental spot asset markets. Econometrica, 56, 1119-1152.
34.
Smith, V. L., Williams, A., Bratton, W. K., & Vannoni, M. G. (1982). Competitive market institutions: Double auctions vs. sealed bid-offer auctions. American Economic Review, 72, 58-77.
35.
Starr, R. (1976). Decentralized nonmonetary trade. Econometrica, 44, 1087-1089.
36.
Sunder, S. (1995). Experimental asset markets: A survey. In J. H. Kagel & A. E. Roth (Eds.), Handbook of experimental economics (pp. 445-500). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
37.
Von Neumann, J. & Morgenstern, O. (1944). The theory of games and economic behavior. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
38.
Whitman, M. J., & Shubik, M. (1979). The aggressive conservative investor. New York: Random House.
39.
Wilson, R. (1987). Equilibrium in bid-ask markets. In E. Fiewel (Ed.), Arrow and the ascent of economic theory (pp. 375-414). London: McMillan.
