On Taking too Much

Abstract

Two studies, using pairs of subjects, compared three strategiesfor resource accumulationunilateral ("GRIT"-like), bilateral (mutual agreement), and free choice. A third study explored why subjects were very ready to take resources from their partners, even when it was against the interests of both parties. The first study (N = 20 pairs) was carried out in England while the Soviet-Western arms race was still in progress; the second was done in the United States in the post-Soviet era (N = 144 subjects recruited by 28 student subjects! experimenters). Although the second study incorporated penalties for taking points from one s partner, results were similar in both studies. On average, both players-in all three strategies-accrued about the same number of "weaponlike" resources. In particular, the GRIT-like strategy fared as well as the bilateral-agreement strategy, even though it did not require mutual agreement. Marked individual differences under all conditions were examined. Subjects in the third study were less likely to take their partners' resources if pairs' common goals were explicitly manifest in joint rewards.